Secure Multiparty Computation from SGX by Portela, Bernardo et al.
                          Portela, B., Barbosa, M. B. M., Brasser, F., Portela, B., Sadeghi, A-R., Scerri,
G., & Warinschi, B. (2017). Secure Multiparty Computation from SGX. In
Financial Cryptography and Data Security 2017: Twenty-First International
Conference, April 3–7, 2017, The Palace Hotel, Malta . International
Financial Cryptography Association.
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research
PDF-document
This is the author accepted manuscript (AAM). The final published version (version of record) is available online
via http://fc17.ifca.ai/preproceedings/paper_89.pdf
University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research
General rights
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published
version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available:
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/pure/about/ebr-terms.html
Secure Multiparty Computation from SGX
Abstract. In this paper we show how Isolated Execution Environments (IEE)
offered by novel commodity hardware such as Intel’s SGX provide a new path to
constructing general secure multiparty computation (MPC) protocols. Our proto-
col is intuitive and elegant: it uses code within an IEE to play the role of a trusted
third party (TTP), and the attestation guarantees of SGX to bootstrap secure com-
munications between participants and the TTP. The load of communications and
computations on participants only depends on the size of each party’s inputs and
outputs and is thus small and independent from the intricacies of the functionality
to be computed. The remaining computational load– essentially that of comput-
ing the functionality – is moved to an untrusted party running an IEE-enabled
machine, an attractive feature for Cloud-based scenarios.
Our rigorous modular security analysis relies on the novel notion of labeled at-
tested computation which we put forth in this paper. This notion is a convenient
abstraction of the kind of attestation guarantees one can obtain from trusted hard-
ware in multi-user scenarios.
Finally, we present an extensive experimental evaluation of our solution on SGX-
enabled hardware. Our implementation is open-source and it is functionality ag-
nostic: it can be used to securely outsource to the Cloud arbitrary off-the-shelf
collaborative software, such as the one employed on financial data applications,
enabling secure collaborative execution over private inputs provided by multiple
parties.
1 Introduction
Secure multiparty computation (MPC) allows a set of mutually distrusting parties to
collaboratively carry out a computation that involves their private inputs. The security
guarantee that parties get are essentially those provided by carrying out the same com-
putation using a Trusted Third Party (TTP). The computations to be carried out range
from simple functionalities, for example where a party commits to a secret value and
later on reveals it; or they can be highly complex, for example running sealed bid auc-
tions [11] or bank customer benchmarking [20]. Most of the existent approaches are
software only. The trust barrier between parties is overcome using cryptographic tech-
niques that permit computing over encrypted and/or secret-shared data [35,28,19]. An-
other approach first studied by Katz [31] formalizes a trusted hardware assumption—
where users have access to tamper-proof tokens on which they can load arbitrary code—
that is sufficient to bootstrap universally composable MPC.
Broadly speaking, this work fits within the same category as that by Katz [15].
However, our starting point is a novel real-world form of trusted hardware that is cur-
rently shipped on commodity PCs: Intel’s Software Guard Extensions [30]. Our goal is
to leverage this hardware to significantly reduce the computational costs of practical se-
cure computation protocols. The main security capability that such hardware offers are
Isolated Execution Environments (IEE) – a powerful tool for boosting trust in remote
systems under the total or partial control of malicious parties (hijacked boot, corrupt
OS, running malicious software, or simply a dishonest service provider). Specifically,
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code loaded in an IEE is executed in isolation from other software present in the sys-
tem,1 and built-in cryptographic attestation mechanisms guarantee the integrity of the
code and its I/O behaviour to a remote user.
PROTOCOL OUTLINE. The functionality outlined above suggests a simple and natu-
ral design for general multiparty computation: load the functionality to be computed
into an IEE (which plays the role of a TTP) and have users provide inputs and receive
outputs via secure channels to the IEE. Attestation ensures the authenticity of the com-
puted function, inputs and outputs. The resulting protocol is extremely efficient when
compared to existing solutions that do not rely on hardware assumptions. Indeed, the
load of communications and computations on protocol participants is small and inde-
pendent of the intricacies of the functionality that is being computed; it depends only
on the size of each party’s inputs and outputs. The remaining computational load —
essentially that of computing the functionality expressed as a transition function in a
standard programming language — is moved to an untrusted party running an IEE-
enabled machine. This makes the protocol attractive for Cloud scenarios. Furthermore,
the protocol is non-interactive in the sense that each user can perform an initial set-up,
and then provide its inputs and receive outputs independently of other protocol partici-
pants, which means that it provides a solution for “secure computation on the web” [27]
with standard MPC security.
Due to its obvious simplicity, variations of the overall idea have been proposed in
several practice-oriented works [40,26]. However, currently there is no thorough and
rigorous analysis of the security guarantees provided by this solution in the sense of a
general approach to MPC. The intuitive appeal of the protocol obscures multiple ob-
stacles in obtaining a formal security proof, including: i. the lack of private channels
between the users and the remote machine; ii. the need to authenticate/agree on a com-
putation in a setting where communication between parties is inherently asynchronous
and only mediated by the IEE; iii. the need to ensure that the “right” parties are engaged
in the computation; iv. dealing with the interaction between different parts of the code
that coexist within the same IEE, sharing the same memory space, each potentially cor-
responding to different users; and v. ensuring that the code running inside an IEE does
not leak sensitive information to untrusted code running outside.
In this paper we fill this gap through the following contributions: i. a rigorous speci-
fication of the protocol for general MPC computation outlined above; ii. formal security
definitions for the security of the overall protocol and that of its components;2 iii. a mod-
ular security analysis of our protocol that relies on a novel notion of labelled attested
computation; and iv. an open-source implementation of our protocol and a detailed ex-
perimental analysis in SGX-enabled hardware. We give an overview of our results next.
LABELED ATTESTED COMPUTATION. Our protocol relies on ideal functionalities viewed
as programs written as transition functions in a programming language compatible with
the IEE-enabled machine. We instrument these programs to run inside an IEE and add
1 We discuss the issue of side-channels that may disrupt the isolation barrier later in the paper.
2 Since our emphasis is on efficiency and analysing SGX-based protocols used in practice, we
do not consider Universal Composability, but rather a simulation-based security model akin to
those used for other practical secure computation protocols, e.g. [7].
2
bootstrapping code that permits protocol participants to establish independent secure
channels with the functionality, so that they can provide inputs and receive outputs. The
crux of the protocol is a means to provide attestation guarantees which ensures that
parties are involved in the “right" run of the protocol (i.e. with the right parties all inter-
acting with the same IEE). We take inspiration from the recent work of Barbosa et al.[3]
who provide a formalization for the notion of attested computation that can convince
a party that its local view of the interaction with a remote IEE matches what actually
occurred remotely. This guarantee is close to the one that we need, but it is unfortu-
nately insufficient. The problem is that attested computation a la [3] is concerned with
the interaction between a single party and an IEE, and it is non-trivial to extend these
guarantees to the interaction of multiple parties with the same IEE when the goal is to
reason about concurrent asynchronous interactions.
To overcome these problem, we introduce the notion of labelled attested compu-
tation (LAC), a powerful and clean generalization of the attested computation notion
in [3]. In a nutshell, this notion assumes that (parts of) the code loaded in an IEE is
marked with labels pertaining to users, and that individual users can get attestation
guarantees for those parts of the code that corresponds to specific labels. The gain is
that users can now be oblivious of other user’s interactions with the IEE, which leads to
significantly more simple and efficient protocols. Nonetheless, the user can still derive
attestation guarantees about the overall execution of the system, since LAC binds each
users’ local view to the same code running within the IEE, and one can use standard
cryptographic techniques to leverage this binding in order to obtain indirect attestation
guarantees as to the honest executions of the interactions with other users.
We provide syntax and a formal security model for LAC and show how this prim-
itive can be used to deploy arbitrary (labelled) programs to remote IEEs with flexible
attestation guarantees. Our provably secure LAC protocol relies on hardware equipped
with SGX-like IEEs. Our construction of the MPC protocol then builds on LACs in
a modular way. First, we show how to use labelled attested computation schemes3 to
bootstrap an arbitrary number of independent secure channels between local users and
an IEE with joint attestation guarantees. We formalize this result as an utility theorem.
The security of the overall MPC protocol which uses these channels for communication
with functionality code inside an IEE is then built on this utility theorem.
IMPLEMENTATION AND EXPERIMENTAL VALIDATION. We conclude the paper with
an experimental evaluation of our protocol via a detailed comparison of our solution
to state-of-the-art multiparty computation. The experimental results confirm the the-
oretical performance advantages that we have highlighted above in comparison to non
hardware-based solutions. Our implementation of a generic MPC protocol —sgx-mpc—
relies on the NaCl4 cryptographic library [9] and inherits its careful approach to dealing
with timing side-channels. We discuss side-channels in SGX-like systems and explain
3 We use schemes which satisfy the additional notion of minimal leakage which ensures that the
outsourced instrumented program P ∗ reveals no information about its internal state beyond
what the normal input/output behavior of the original program P would reveal.
4 https://nacl.cr.yp.to
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how our constant-time code thwarts all leaks based on control-flow or memory access
patterns that depend on secret data.
Our implementation is functionality agnostic and can be used to outsource to the
Cloud arbitrary off-the-shelf collaborative software, enabling multiple parties to jointly
execute complex interactive computations without revealing their own inputs. Taking
the financial sector as an example, our implementation permits carrying out financial
benchmarking [20] using off-the-shelf software, rather than requiring the conversion of
the underlying computation into circuit form, as is the case in state-of-the-art secure
multiparty computation protocols. One should of course mention that, in order to meet
the level of side-channel attack resilience of sgx-mpc, the code that is outsourced to
the Cloud should itself be implemented according to the constant-time coding policy.
This, however, is a software engineering issue that is outside of the scope of this paper.
RELATED WORK. A relevant line of research leverages trusted hardware to bootstrap
entire platforms for secure software execution (e.g. Flicker [36], Trusted Virtual Do-
mains [16], Haven [5]). These are large systems that are currently outside the scope of
provable-security techniques. Smaller protocols which solve specific problems are more
susceptible to rigorous analysis. Examples of these are secure disk encryption [37], one-
time password authentication [29] outsourced Map-Reduce computations [40], Secure
Virtual Disk Images [24], two-party computation [26], secure embedded devices [38,33].
Although some of these protocols (e.g., those of Hoekstra et al. [29] and Gupta et
al [26]) come only with intuition regarding their security, others—most notably those
by Schuster et. al [40]—come with a proof of security. The use of attestation in those
protocols is akin to our use of attestation in our general MPC protocol. Provable secu-
rity of realistic protocols that use trusted hardware-based protocols based on the Trusted
Platform Module (TPM) have been considered in [13,41,12,23,22]. The weaker capa-
bilities offered by the TPM makes them more suitable for static attestation than for a
dynamic setting like the one we consider in this paper.
In recent independent work Pass, Shi and Tramer [39] formalize attestation guaran-
tees offered by trusted hardware in the Universal Composability setting, and consider
the feasibility of achieving UC-secure MPC from such assumptions. Interestingly, they
show that in the setting that they consider (UC with a Global Setup (GUC) [14]) mul-
tiparty computation is impossible to achieve without additional assumptions, unless all
parties have access to trusted hardware. They bypass this impossibility result by assum-
ing that all parties have access to both trusted hardware as well some additional set-up.
The resulting protocols are more intricate and less efficient than ours, so our results
can be interpreted as a practice-oriented approach to the security of the most natural
MPC protocol that relies on SGX, which trades composability for efficiency while still
preserving strong privacy guarantees for the inputs to the computation.
The overarching goal of our work is shared with the rich literature on software-only
multiparty secure computation. In Appendix A we refer the works that are close to ours
in the sense that they aim to bring secure multiparty computation to practice.
In Appendix C we recap the formal definitions for standard the cryptographic prim-
itives we use in this work, including the partially authenticated notion of key exchange
specialized for attestation settings introduced in [3].
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2 IEEs, Programs, and Machines
The models that we develop in this paper rely on the abstraction for IEEs introduced
in [3]. Here we recall the key features of that model. A more in depth description of
these formalisms is provided in Appendix B.
An IEE is viewed as an idealised machine running some fixed program P and which
exposes an interface through which one can pass inputs and receive outputs to/from P .
The I/O behaviour of a process running in an IEE is determined by the program it is
running, and the inputs it receives. The interface models the strict isolation between pro-
cesses running in different IEEs and formalizes that the only information that is revealed
about a program running within an IEE is contained in its input-output behaviour.
PROGRAMS. We extend the model for programs from [3] to the setting where in-
puts/outputs are labeled: programs are transition functions which take a current state
st and a label-input pair (l, i), and produce a new output o and an updated state. We
write o ← P [st](l, i) for each such action and refer to it as an activation. Through-
out the paper we restrict our attention to programs (even if they are adversarially cre-
ated) for which the transition function is guaranteed to run in polynomial-time. Pro-
grams are assumed to be deterministic modulo of system calls; in particular we as-
sume a system can call rand for providing programs with fresh randomness. Addi-
tionally, outputs are assumed to include a flag finished that indicating if the transi-
tion function will accept further input. We extend our notation to account for prob-
abilistic programs that invoke the rand system call. We write o ← P [st; r](l, i) for
the activation of P which when invoked on labeled input (l, i) (with internal state
st and random coins r) produced output o. We write a sequence of activations as
(o1, . . . , on) ← P [st; r](l1, i1, . . . , ln, in) and denote by TraceP [st;r](l1, i1, . . . , ln, in)
the corresponding input/output trace (l1, i1, o1, . . . , ln, in, on). For a trace T , we write
filter[L](T ) for the projection of the trace that retains only I/O pairs that correspond
to labels in L. We use filter[l] when L is a singleton. We also extend the basic notion
of program composition in [3] to consider label-based parallel and sequential program
composition. Intuitively, when two labelled programs are composed, the set of labels
of the composed program is enriched to encode the precise sub-program that should be
activated and the label on which it should be activated.
MACHINES. As in [3] we model machines via a simple external interface, which we
see as both the functionality that higher-level cryptographic schemes can rely on when
using the machine, and the adversarial interface that will be the basis of our attack
models. This interface can be thought of as an abstraction of Intel’s SGX [30]. The
interface consists of three calls: 1. Init(1λ) initialises the machine and outputs the global
parameters prms. 2. Load(P ) loads the program P in a fresh IEE and returns its handle
hdl 3. Run(hdl, l, i) passes the label-input pair (l, i) to the IEE with handle hdl. We
define the I/O trace TraceM(hdl) of a process hdl running in a machineM as the tuple
(l1, i1, o1, . . . , ln, in, on) that includes the entire sequence of n inputs/outputs resulting
from all invocations of Run on hdl; ProgramM(hdl) is the code (program) running
under handle hdl; CoinsM(hdl) represents the coins given to the program by the rand
system call; and StateM(hdl) is the internal state of the program. Finally, we will write
AM to indicate that algorithm A has access to machineM.
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3 Labelled Attested Computation
We now formalize a cryptographic primitive that generalizes the notion of Attested
Computation proposed in [3], called Labelled Attested Computation. The main dif-
ference to the original proposal is that, rather than fixing a particular form of program
composition for attestation, Labelled Attested Computation is agnostic of the program’s
internal structure; on the other hand, it permits controlling data flows and attestation
guarantees via the label information included in program inputs.
SYNTAX. A Labelled Attested Computation (LAC) scheme is defined by the following
algorithms:
– Compile(prms, P, L∗) is the deterministic program compilation algorithm. On input
global parameters for some machineM, program P and an attested label set L∗, it
outputs program P ∗. This algorithm is run locally. P ∗ is the code to be run as an
isolated process in the remote machine, whereas L∗ defines which labelled inputs
should be subject to attestation guarantees.
– Attest(prms, hdl, l, i) is the stateless attestation algorithm. On input global parame-
ters for M, a process handle hdl and label-input pair (l, i), it uses the interface of
M to obtain attested output o∗. This algorithm is run remotely, but in an unprotected
environment: it is responsible for interacting with the isolated process running P ∗,
providing it with inputs and recovering the attested outputs that should be returned to
the local machine.
– Verify(prms, l, i, o∗, st) is the public (stateful) output verification algorithm. On input
global parameters forM, a label l, an input i, an attested output o∗ and some state st
it produces an output value o and an updated state, or the failure symbol ⊥. This fail-
ure symbol is encoded so as to be distinguishable from a valid output of a program,
resulting from a successful verification. This algorithm is run locally on claimed out-
puts from the Attest algorithm. The initial value of the verification state is set to be
(prms, P, L∗), the same inputs provided to Compile.
Intuitively, a LAC scheme is correct if, for any given program P and attested label
set L∗, assuming an honest execution of all components in the scheme, both locally
and remotely, the local user is able to accurately reconstruct a partial view of the I/O
sequence that took place in the remote environment, for an arbitrary set of labels L. A
formal definition of correctness is provided in Appendix D.
SECURITY. Security of labelled attested computation imposes that an adversary with
control of the remote machine cannot convince the local user that some arbitrary re-
mote (partial) execution of a program P has occurred, when it has not. It says nothing
about the parts of the execution trace that are hidden from the client or are not in the
attested label set L∗. Formally, we allow the adversary to freely interact with the re-
mote machine, whilst providing a sequence of (potentially forged) attested outputs for
a specific label l ∈ L∗. The adversary wins if the local user reconstructs an execution
trace without aborting (i.e., all attested outputs must be accepted by the verification al-
gorithm) and one of two conditions occur: i. there does not exist a remote process hdl∗
running a compiled version of P where a consistent set of inputs was provided for label
l; or ii. the outputs recovered by the local user for those inputs are not consistent with
the semantics of P .
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Game AttLAC,A(1λ):
prms←$M.Init(1λ); (P,L∗, l, n, stA)←$ A1(prms); P∗ ← Compile(prms, P, L∗); stV ← (prms, P, L∗)
For k ∈ [1..n] :
(ik, o
∗
k, stA)←$ AM2 (stA); (ok, stV )← Verify(prms, l, ik, o∗k, stV )
If ok =⊥ Return F
T ← (l, i1, o1, . . . , l, in, on)
For hdl∗ s.t. ProgramM(hdl
∗) = P∗
(l′1, i
′
1, o
′
1, . . . , l
′
m, i
′
m, o
′
m)← TraceMR (hdl∗); T ′ ← filter[l](TraceP [st;CoinsM(hdl∗)](l
′
1, i
′
1, . . . , l
′
m, i
′
m))
If T v T ′ Return F
Return T
Fig. 1. Game defining the security of LAC.
Technically, these conditions are checked in the definition by retrieving the full
sequence of label-input pairs and random coins passed to all compiled copies of P
running in the remote machine and running P on the same inputs to obtain the expected
outputs. One then checks that for at least one of these executions, when the traces are
restricted to special label l, that the expected trace matches the locally recovered trace
via Verify. Since the adversary is free to interact with the remote machine as it pleases,
we cannot hope to prevent it from providing arbitrary inputs to the remote program
at arbitrary points in time, while refusing to deliver the resulting (possibly attested)
outputs to the local user. This justifies the winning condition referring to a prefix of
the execution in the remote machine, rather than imposing trace equality. Indeed, the
definition’s essence is to impose that, if the adversary delivers attested outputs for a
particular label in the attested label set, then the subtrace of verified outputs for that
label will be an exact prefix of the projection of the remote trace for that label.
We note that a higher-level protocol relying on LAC can fully control the seman-
tics of labels, as these depend on the semantics of the compiled program. In particular,
adopting the specific forms of parallel and sequential composition presented in Sec-
tion 2, it is possible to use labels to get the attested execution of a sub-program that is
fully isolated from other programs that it is composed with. This provides a much higher
degree of flexibility than that offered by the original notion of Attested Computation.
Definition 1 (Security). A labelled attested computation scheme is secure if, for all ppt
adversaries A, the probability that experiment in Fig. 1 returns T is negligible.
The adversary loses the game if there exists at least one remote process that matches
the locally reconstructed trace. This should be interpreted as the guarantee that IEE re-
sources are indeed being allocated in a specific remote machine to run at least one in-
stance of the remote program (note that if the program is deterministic, many instances
could exist with exactly the same I/O behaviour, which is not seen as a legitimate at-
tack). Furthermore, our definition imposes that the compiled program uses essentially
the same randomness as the source program (except of course for randomness that the
security module internally uses to provide its cryptographic functionality), as otherwise
it is easy for the adversary to make the (idealized) local trace diverge from the remote.
This is a consequence of our modelling approach, but it does not limit the applicability
of our primitive: it simply spells out that the transformation performed on the code for
attestation will typically consist of an instrumentation of the code by applying crypto-
graphic processing to the inputs and outputs it receives.
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MINIMAL LEAKAGE. The above discussion shows that a LAC scheme guarantees that
the I/O behaviour of the program in the remote machine includes at least the information
required to reconstruct an hypothetical local execution of the source program. Next,
we require that a compiled program does not reveal any information beyond what the
original program would reveal. We achieve this by imposing that our LAC schemes
satisfy the minimal leakage definition from [3] (recalled in Appendix D) which ensures
that nothing from the internal state of the source programs (in addition to what is public,
i.e., the code and I/O sequence) is leaked in the trace of the compiled program.
4 LAC from SGX-like systems
Our labelled attested computation protocol relies on the capabilities offered by the se-
curity module of Secure Guard Extensions (SGX) architecture proposed by Intel [2]
(i.e. MACs for authenticated communication between IEEs, and digital signatures for
inter-platform attestation of executions). Our security module formalization is the same
as the one adopted in [3].
SECURITY MODULE. The security module relies on a signature scheme and a MAC
scheme,and operates as follows:
– On initialization, the security module generates a key pair (pk, sk) and a symmetric
key key.It also creates a special process running code S∗ in an IEE with handle 0. The
security module then securely stores the key material, and outputs the public key.
– The operation of IEE with handle 0 is different from all other IEEs in the machine.
Program S∗ will permanently reside in this IEE, and it will be the only one with
direct access to both sk and key. The code of S∗ is dedicated to transforming messages
authenticated with key into messages signed with sk. On activation, it expects an input
(m, t). It obtains key from the security module and verifies the tag. If the previous
operation was successful, it obtains sk from the security module, signs the message
and outputs the signature.
– The security module exposes a single system call mac(m) to code running in all other
IEEs. On such a request from a process running program P , the security module
returns a MAC tag t computed using key over both the code of P and the input
message m.
LABELLED ATTESTED COMPUTATION SCHEME. We now define a LAC scheme that
relies on a remote machine supporting such a security module. Basic replay protection
using a sequence number does not suffice to bind a remote process to a subtrace, since
the adversary could then run multiple copies of the same process and mix and match
outputs from various traces. This is similar to the reasoning in [3]. However, in this
paper we are interested in validating traces for specific attested labels, independently
from each other, rather than the full remote trace. Our LAC scheme works as follows:
– Compile(prms, P, L) generates a new program P ∗ and outputs it. Program P ∗ is
instrumented as follows:
• in addition to the internal state st of P , it maintains a list iosl of all the I/O pairs it
has previously received and computed for each label l ∈ L.
• On input (l, i), P ∗ computes o←$ P [stP ](l, i) and verifies if l ∈ L. If this is not
the case, then P ∗ simply outputs non-attested output o.
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• Otherwise, it updates the list ios by appending (l, i, o), computes the subset of ios
for label l : iosl ← filter[l](ios) and requests from the security module a MAC of
for that list. Due to the operation of the security module, this will correspond to a
tag t on the tuple (P ∗, iosl).
• It finally outputs (o, t, P ∗, iosl). We note that we include (P ∗, iosl) explicitly in
the outputs of P ∗ for clarity of presentation only. This value would be kept in an
insecure environment by a stateful Attest program.
– Attest(prms, hdl, l, i) invokesM.Run(hdl, (l, i)) using the handle and input value it
has received. Attest then checks is the produced output o is to be attested and if so
transforms the tag into a signature σ using the IEE with handle 0 and outputs (o′, σ).
Otherwise it simply outputs o.
– Verify(prms, l, i, o∗, st) is the stateful verification algorithm. Initially st = (prms, P, L∗),
on first activation Verify computes and stores P ∗ and initialises an empty list ios
of input-output pairs. Verify returns o∗ if l 6∈ L. Otherwise, it first parses o∗ into
(o, σ), appends (l, i, o) to ios and verifies the digital signature σ using prms and
(P ∗, filter[l](ios)). If parsing or verification fails, Verify outputs⊥. If not, then Verify
outputs o.
It is easy to see that our LAC scheme is correct. A precise argument for correctness
is provided in Appendix D.
Theorem 1 (LAC scheme security). The LAC scheme presented above provides se-
cure attestation if the underlying MAC scheme Π and signature scheme Σ are existen-
tially unforgeable. Furthermore, it unconditionally ensures minimum leakage.
The full proof of this theorem can be found in Appendix E. The proof intuition is a
generalization of the argument for the attested computation scheme in [3]. All attested
outputs are bound to a partial execution trace that contains the entire I/O sequence
associated with the corresponding attested label, so all messages accepted by Verify
must exist as a prefix for a remote trace of some instance of P ∗. The adversary can
only cause an inconsistency in T v T ′ if the signature verification performed by Verify
accepts a message of label l ∈ L∗ that was never authenticated by an IEE running P ∗.
However, in this case the adversary is either breaking the MAC scheme (and dishonestly
executing Attest), or breaking the signature (directly forging attested outputs).
5 Secure computation with IEEs
FUNCTIONALITIES. We want to securely execute a functionality F defined by a four-
tuple (n,F, Lin, Lout), where F is a deterministic stateful transition function that takes
inputs of the form (id, i). Here, id is a party identifier, which we assume to be an integer
in the range [1..n], and n is the total number of participating parties. On each transition,
F produces an output that is intended for party id, as well as an updated state. We
associate to F two leakage functions Lin(k, i, st) and Lout(k, o, st) which define the
public leakage that can be revealed by a protocol about a given input i or output o
for party k, respectively; for the sake of generality, both functions may depend on the
internal state st of the functionality, although this is not the case in the examples we
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consider in this paper. Arbitrary reactive functionalities formalized in the Universal
Composability framework can be easily recast as a transition function such as this. The
upside of our approach is that one obtains a precise code-based definition of what the
functionality should do (this is central to our work since these descriptions give rise to
concrete programs); the downside is that the code-based definitions may be less clear to
a human reader, as one cannot ignore the tedious book-keeping parts of the functionality.
EXECUTION MODEL. We assume the existence of a machineM allowing for the us-
age of isolated execution environments, as defined in Section 2. In secure computation
terms, this machine should not be seen as an ideal functionality that enables some hybrid
model of computation, but rather an additional party that comes with a specific setup
assumption, a fixed internal operation, and which cannot be corrupted. Importantly, all
interactions withM and all the code that is run inM but outside IEEs is considered to
be adversarially controlled.
SYNTAX. A protocol pi for functionality F is a seven-tuple of algorithms as follows:
– Setup – This is the party local set-up algorithm. Given the security parameter, the
public parameters prms for machine M and the party’s identifier id, it returns the
party’s initial state st (incluing its secret key material) and its public information
pub.
– Compile – This is the (deterministic) code generation algorithm. Given the descrip-
tion of a functionality F, and public parameters (prms,Pub) for both the remote ma-
chine and the entire set of public parameters for the participating parties, it generates
the instrumented program that will run inside an IEE.
– Remote – This is the untrusted code that will be run in M and which ensures the
correctness of the protocol by controlling its scheduling and input collection order. It
has oracle access toM and is in charge of collecting inputs and delivering outputs. Its
initial state describes the order in which inputs of different parties should be provided
to the functionality.
– Init – This is the party local protocol initialization algorithm. Given the party’s state
st produced by Setup and the public information of all participants Pub it outputs an
uptated state st. We note that a party can choose to engage in a protocol by checking
if the public parameters of all parties are correct and assigned to roles in the protocol
that match the corresponding identities.
– AddInput – This is the party local input providing algorithm. Given the party’s current
state st and an input in, it outputs an uptated state st.
– Process – This is the party local message processing algorithm. Given its internal
state st, and an input message m, it runs the next protocol stage, updates the internal
state and returns output message m′.
– Output – This is the party local output retrieval algorithm. Given internal state st, it
returns the current output o.
Intuitively such a protocol is correct if it can support any execution schedule whilst
evaluating the functionality correctly. A precise definition is provided in Appendix F.
SECURITY. As is customary in secure computation models, we take the ideal world ver-
sus real world approach to define security of a protocol. Our security model is presented
in Figure 2, and is described as follows. In the real world, the adversary interacts with
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Game RealF,pi,A,M(1λ):
(n, F, Lin, Lout)← F
prms←$M.Init(1λ)
(stA, k)←$ A(prms)
For id ∈ [1..k]:
(stid, pubid)←$ Setup(prms, id)
Pub← (pub1, ..., pubk)
For id ∈ [k + 1..n]:
(stA, pubid)←$ A(stA, id,Pub)
Pub← (pub1, ..., pubn)
For id ∈ [1..k]:
stid←$ Init(stid,Pub)
b←$ AO(stA)
Oracle Send(id,m):
If id 6∈ [1..k] Return⊥
(stid,m
′)←$ Process(stid,m)
Returnm′
Oracle SetInput(in, id):
If id 6∈ [1..k] Return⊥
stid←$ AddInput(in, stid)
Oracle Load(P ):
ReturnM.Load(P )
Oracle Run(hdl, l, x):
ReturnM.Run(hdl, l, x)
Oracle GetOutput(id):
If id 6∈ [1..k] Return⊥
Return Output(stid)
Game IdealF,pi,A,S(1λ):
(n, F, Lin, Lout)← F
stF ← 
(st, prms)←$ S(1λ)
(stA, k)←$ A(prms)
For id ∈ [1..k]:
(st, pubid)←$ S(st, id)
ListInid ← [ ]
ListOutid ← [ ]
Pub← (pub1, ..., pubk)
For id ∈ [k + 1..n]:
(stA, pubid)←$ A(stA, id,Pub)
Pub← (pub1, ..., pubn)
For id ∈ [1..k]:
st←$ S(st, id,Pub)
b←$ AO(stA)
Oracle Fun(id, in):
If id ∈ [1..k]:
(in1, . . . , ink)← ListInid
ListInid ← (in1, . . . , ink-1)
out← F[stF](id, ink)
ListOutid ← out : ListInid
Return Lout(out, id, stF)
Else
out← F[stF](id, in)
Return out
Oracle SetInput(in, id):
If i 6∈ [1..k] Return⊥
`← Lin(in, id, stF)
st←$ S(st, `, id)
ListInid ← in : ListInid
Oracle Send(id,m):
(st, out)←$ SFun(st, id,m)
Return out
Oracle Load(P ):
(st, out)←$ S(st, P )
Return out
Oracle Run(hdl, l, x):
(st, out)←$ SFun(st, hdl, l, x)
Return out
Oracle GetOutput(id):
If id 6∈ [1..k] Return⊥
i←$ S(st, id)
(out1, . . . , outk)← ListOutid
Return out1 || . . . || outi
Fig. 2. Real and Ideal security games.
an IEE-enabled machineM under adversarial control and oracles SetInput, GetOutput
and Send providing it with the locally run part of the protocol. In the ideal world, the
adversary is presented with 1. a simulator S emulating the remote machine, the setup
phase, and the Send oracle 2. idealised oracles SetInput, GetOutput. The idealised ora-
cles only do book-keeping of which input should be transmitted next and which output
should be retrieved next for each honest party. S gets given oracle access to a function-
ality evaluation oracle Fun that consumes the next input of a party (defined in SetInput
if the party is honest, passed as input otherwise) and sets the next output for this party,
returning the leakage of the input and output if the party is honest, and the full output
otherwise. A protocol is deemed secure if there exists a ppt simulator such that no ppt
adersary can distinguish the two worlds.
Definition 2. We say pi is secure for F if, for any ppt adversary A, there exists a ppt
simulator S such that the following definition of advantage is a negligible function in
the security parameter.
|Pr[RealF,pi,A,M(1λ)⇒ b = 1]− Pr[IdealF,pi,A,S(1λ)⇒ b = 1] |
Succinctly, our model is inspired in the UC framework, and can be derived from it
when natural restrictions are imposed: PKI, static corruptions, and a distinguished non-
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corruptible party modeling an SGX-enabled machine.5 A security proof for a protocol
in our model can be interpreted as translation of any attack against the protocol in the
real world, as an attack against the ideal functionality in the ideal world. The simulator
performs this translation by presenting an execution environment to the adversary that
is consistent with what it is expecting in the real world. It does this by simulating the
operations of the Load, Run and Send oracles, which represent the operation of hon-
est parties in the protocol. While the adversary is able to provide the inputs and read
the outputs for honest parties directly from the functionality, the simulator is only able
obtain partial leakage about this values via the Lin and Lout functions. Conversely, it
can obtain the functionality outputs for corrupt parties via the Fun oracle and, further-
more, it is also able to control the rate and order in which all inputs are provided to the
functionality. Were this not the case, the adversary would be able to distinguish the two
worlds by manipulating scheduling in a way the simulator could not possibly match.
6 A New MPC Protocol from SGX
In this section we describe our secure multiparty computation protocol based on LAC
that works for any functionality. The protocol starts by running bootstrap code in an
isolated execution environment in the remote machine; the code exchanges keys with
each of the participants in the protocol. These key exchange programs are composed in
parallel, as seen in Section 2. We reuse the notion of AttKE (key exchange for attested
computation) from [3] which provides the right notion of key exchange security in this
context. We recall the definition of AttKE security in Appendix C. Once this bootstrap
stage is concluded, the code of the functionality starts executing. The functionality uses
the secure channels established before to ensure that the inputs and outputs are private
and authenticated. The security of this protocol relies on a utility theorem similar to that
of [3] for the use of key exchange in the context of attestation. This theorem shows that,
under the specific program composition pattern that we require for our MPC protocol,
which guarantees AttKE isolation from other programs, each party obtains a secret key
that is indistinguishable from a random string. It follows that the key can be used to
construct a secure channel that connects it to code emulating the functionality within an
IEE. Details are provided in Appendix G.
BOXING USING AUTHENTICATED ENCRYPTION. As explained above, after the boot-
strapping stage of our protocol, we run the ideal functionality within an isolated execu-
tion environment. We implement this part of the execution using the boxing construction
shown in Figure 3. The name comes by analogy with placing the functionality within a
box, which parties can access via secure channels. The labelled program Box〈F , Λ〉 is
parametrized by a functionality F for n parties and a secure authenticated encryption
encryption scheme Λ. Its initial state is assumed to contain n symmetric keys compat-
ible with Λ, denoted sk1 to skn (one for each participating party) and the empty initial
state for the functionality stF. The Box expects encrypted inputs i∗ under a label l iden-
tifying the party providing the input. These are then decrypted using the respective key
5 This particular choice in our model has implications for the composability properties of our
results, as discussed in the related work section.
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Program Box〈F, Λ〉[st](i∗, l):
(n, F, Lin, Lout)← F
id← l
If id /∈ [1..n] : Return⊥
If st.seqid =  : st.seqid ← 0
i← Λ.Dec(st.keyid,m)
If m 6= (in, st.seqid) : Return⊥
o← F [st.stF](id, in)
st.seqid ← st.seqid + 1
c←$ Λ.Enc(st.keyid, (seq, o))
st.seqid ← st.seqid + 1
Return c
Fig. 3. Boxing using Authenticated Encryption
skl and provided to F . The value returned by the functionality is encrypted using the
same skl and is then returned. To avoid replays of encrypted messages, we keep one
sequence number seqid per communicating party id.
THE PROTOCOL. Building on top of a LAC scheme, an AttKE scheme and our Box
construction we define a general secure multiparty computation protocol that works for
any (possibly reactive) functionality F. The core of the protocol is the execution of an
AttKE for each participant in parallel, followed by the execution of the functionality F
on the remote machine, under a secure channel with each participant as specified in the
Box construct. More precisely:
– Setup derives the code for a remote key exchange program RemKE using the AttKE
setup procedure. This code (which intuitively includes cryptographic public key ma-
terial) is set to be the public information for this party. The algorithm also stores
various parameters in the local state for future usage.
– Compile uses the LAC compilation algorithm on a program that results from the
parallel composition of all the remote key exchange programs for all parties, which
is then sequentially composed with the boxed functionality.
– Init locally recomputes the program that is intended for remote execution, as this is
needed for attestation verification. The set of labels that define the locally recovered
trace is set to those of the form ((p, (id, )), (q, id)), which correspond to those exactly
matching the parts of the remote trace that are relevant for this party, namely its own
key exchange and its own inputs/outputs.
– Process is split into two stages. In the first stage it uses LAC with attested labels of
the form (p, (id, )) to execute AttKE protocol and establish a secure channel with the
remote program. In the second stage, it uses non-attested labels of the form (q, id),
and it provides inputs to the remote functionality (on request) and recovers the corre-
sponding outputs when they are delivered.
– Output reads the output in the state of the participant and returns it.
– AddInput adds an input to the end of the list of inputs that have to be transmitted by
the participant.
Pseudo code of the protocol as well as details of the (untrusted) scheduling algorithm
can be found in Appendix G.
For proving security, we restrict the functionalities we consider to a particular leak-
age function: size of inputs/outputs. We say that a functionality (n,F, Lin, Lout) leaks
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size if it is such that Lin and Lout return the length of the inputs/outputs (Lin(k, x, st) =
Lout(k, x, st) = |x| for every k, x, st).
Theorem 2. If LAC is a correct and secure LAC scheme, AttKE is a secure AttKE
scheme and Λ a secure authenticated encryption scheme, then the protocol described
in this Section is correct and secure for any functionality that leaks size.
PROOF SKETCH. We build the required simulator S as follows. For dishonest parties,
the simulator executes the protocol normally while for the honest parties instead of
encrypting the inputs/outputs the simulator encrypts dummy messages of the correct
length (obtained through the leakage function) under freshly generated keys.
We sketch a proof of indistinguishability between the real world and this ideal
world. A detailed proof can be found in Appendix I. The proof is performed in 3 hops,
the first corresponds to a hybrid argument over the honest parties in the protocol. In this
hybrid argument one gradually replaces the secret key derived by each honest party by
a random one. In each step, the AttKE utility theorem can be used to show that this
change cannot be noticed by the adversary. In the second hop, we replace the encrypted
inputs/outputs for honest parties by encrypted dummy payloads of the correct length.
This hop is correct by the indistinguishability of authenticated encryption ciphertexts.
After this last game hop, the resulting game is identical until bad to the ideal world,
where the bad event corresponds to the simulator aborting due to an inconsistent mes-
sage being accepted as the next undelivered input or output. Due to the use of sequence
numbers, this bad event can be reduced to the authenticity of the encryption scheme and
the Theorem follows.
7 Implementation
We provide an implementation of our protocol sgx-mpc-nacl relying on NaCl for the
cryptographic library and Intel SGX for the IEEs. We make use of elliptic curves for
both the key exchange (Diffie-Hellman) and digital signatures, and a combination of
the Salsa20 and Poly1305 encryption and authentication schemes [9] for authenticated
encryption. Our implementation relies on Intel’s Software Development Kit (SDK) for
dealing with the SGX low-level operations. These include loading code into an IEE (our
Load abstraction), calling a top-level function within the IEE (our Run abstraction), and
constructing an attested message (first getting a MAC’ed message within the IEE, and
using the quoting enclave to convert it into a digital signature). It employs the LAC
scheme proposed in this paper, and include wrappers that match our abstractions of
digital signatures and authenticated encryption. These are then used to construct the se-
cure bootstrapping protocol (AttKE) that enables each party to establish an independent
secret key, and a secure channel that uses this key to communicate with the Box con-
struction running inside the enclave. Finally, our implementation of the Box is agnostic
of the functionality that should be computed by the protocol, and can be linked to arbi-
trary functionality implementations, provided that these comply with a simple labelled
I/O interface. The top-level interface to our protocol includes the code that should be
run inside the IEE, the code that runs outside the IEE in the remote machine to per-
form the book-keeping operations and the client-side code that permits bootstrapping a
secure channel and then send inputs/receive outputs from the functionality.
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We compare our implementation with measurements we performed using the ABY
framework [21]. We chose ABY for comparison, as we could evaluate it on the same
platform we used for assessing our protocol, therefore avoiding differences due to per-
formance disparities of heterogeneous evaluation platforms. Although it is specific to
the two-party secure computation setting, ABY is representative of state-of-the-art MPC
implementations and we expect results for other frameworks such as Sharemind [18]
and SPDZ [19] to lead to similar conclusions; indeed, the crux of our performance
gains resides in the fact that our solution does not require encoding the computation in
circuit form, unlike all the aforementioned protocols.6
Like our protocol, the ABY protocol has two phases: a preparation phase and an
online phase. The preparation phase comprises the key exchange between the input
parties by means of oblivious transfer (OT), and generation of the garbled circuit (GC)
representing the desired function. In the online phase the GC gets evaluated and the
result are send back to the output party. In our protocol, the preparation phase is used to
establish a secure channel between the IEE and the input parties. The online phase of
our protocol comprises the decryption of inputs in the Box component, the evaluation
of the payload function, and the encryption of the results, again by the Box component.
We evaluated the performance of four different secure two-party computation use
cases (Table 1): AES, millionaire’s problem, private set intersection and hamming dis-
tance. In comparison to ABY, the preparation phase and online phase are shorter with
sgx-mpc-nacl, and consequently the overall runtime is faster as well. In general, sgx-
mpc-nacl is faster for all the testing computations performed. However, the gains are
considerably more noticeable when we increase with input size and computation. This
has the highest significance on evaluation of the private set intersection with the largest
input size (1 mill.), where our implementation is roughly 300 times faster.
Table 1. Clockwisely, starting from upper left: hamming distance, AES, millionaire’s problem
and private set intersection
Phase Preparation (ms) Online (ms) Total (ms)
Protocol ABY Ours ABY Ours ABY Ours
In
pu
t
si
ze
(b
it
s
)
160 196.3 115.7 0.752 0.050 197.1 117.75
1600 196.7 115.7 1.819 0.302 198.5 116.00
16000 201.6 115.7 13.14 2.798 214.7 118.50
160000 226.2 115.2 144.4 27.77 370.6 142.97
Phase ABY Ours
Preparation (ms) 197.9 115.84
Online (ms) 3.249 0.661
Total (ms) 201.1 116.50
Phase Preparation Online Total
Protocol ABY Ours ABY Ours ABY Ours
Se
ts
iz
e
100 224.8 115.8 1.084 0.043 225.9 115.84
1000 368.1 115.8 2.168 0.199 370.3 116.00
10,000 1442.2 115.8 12.88 1.758 1455.1 117.56
100,000 10,698.7 115.7 109.5 17.39 10,808.2 133.09
1,000,000 84,096.6 115.7 1616.0 173.1 85,712.6 288.80
Phase ABY Ours
Preparation (ms) 196.3 127.7
Online (ms) 0.404 0.024
Total (ms) 196.7 127.7
In Appendix J we discuss the implications of side-channel vulnerabilities on imple-
mentations over IEE-enabled systems generally and Intel’s SGX in particular, and in
what way our implementation can protect against such attacks.
6 We also note that ABY assumes a semi-honest adversary, which is weaker than the one we
consider; but still our performance gains are significant.
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A Further Related Work
Fairplay is a system originally developed to support two-party computation [35] and
then extended to FairplayMP to support multiparty computation [7]: Fairplay imple-
ments a two party computation protocol in the manner suggested by Yao; FairplayMP
is based on the Beaver-Micali-Rogaway protocol. Sharemind [10] is a secure service
platform for data collection and analysis, employing a 3-party additive secret sharing
scheme and provably secure protocols in the honest-but-curious security model with no
more than one passively corrupted party. TASTY (Tool for Automating Secure Two-
partY computations) is a tool suite addressing secure two-party computation in the
semi-honest model [28] whose main feature allows to compile and evaluate functions
not only using garbled circuits, but also homomorphic encryption schemes, at the same
time. SPDZ [19] is a protocol for general multi party computations considering active
adversaries and tolerating the corruption of n− 1 out of the n parties, leveraging a pre-
processing stage for exchanging randomness between participants, towards reducing
communication requirements associated with the on-line stage.
The main advantage of our solution with respect to the previous systems is its effi-
ciency both for the parties that provide inputs and collect outputs from the computation,
and those that perform the computation. In all of the above solutions, the computation is
distributed, and the communication load for parties performing the computation grows
(with varying degrees of scalability) with the complexity of the computed function-
ality (often expressed as a circuit). In our solution, a single party (the owner of the
IEE-enabled machine) performs the computation which is run essentially as fast as the
program that computes it in the clear, so the overhead is reduced to establishing se-
cure channels with all other participants (which is observable on the measurements
presented in Section 7). For these parties, the overhead is a single key exchange, and
then all the inputs and outputs are transferred using standard authenticated encryption.
On the downside, although our protocol is secure in the presence of active adversaries,
we only consider static corruptions and rely on a strong trust assumption in idealizing
the IEE-enabled machine.
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B IEE, Programs and Machines
We recall here the key features of programs, machines and IEEs from [3] and highlight
the minor modifications we make to this model.
PROGRAMS. The programs are assumed to be written in some programming language
L enriched with IEE system calls. These calls give access to different cryptographic
functionalities offered by security module interface. The cryptography offered may dif-
fer between IEEs. The language L is assumed to be deterministic modulo the operation
of system calls; in particular we assume a system call rand which gives access to fresh
random coins sampled uniformly at random. It is important for our results that system
calls cannot be used by a program to store additional implicit state that would escape
our control. To this end, we impose that the results of system calls within an IEE can
depend only on: i. an initially shared state that is defined when a program is loaded
(e.g., the cryptographic parameters of the machine, and the code of the program); ii. the
input explicitly passed on that particular call; and iii. fresh random coins. As a conse-
quence of this, we may assume that system calls placed by different parts of a program
are identically distributed, assuming that the same input is provided. This is particularly
important when we consider program composition below.
We use the same model for programs as [3] (extended to the settings where in-
puts/outputs are labeled): transition functions which take a current state st and a label-
input pair (l, i), and produce a new output o and an updated state. We write o ←
P [st](l, i) for each such action and refer to it as an activation. Throughout the paper
we restrict our attention to programs (even if they are adversarially created) for which
the transition funtion is guaranteed to run in polynomial-time.Unless otherwise stated,
st is assumed to be initially empty. We impose that every output produced by a program
includes a Boolean flag finished that indicates whether the transition function will ac-
cept further input. We will denote by o.finished the value of this flag in some output o.
The transition function may return arbitrary outputs until it produces an output where
finished = T, at which point it can return no further output or change its state. Some
programs may not use labels internally and, in that case, we simply pass it the empty
string at the label input.
MACHINES. In [3] machines can be accessed through a simple interface abstracting the
capabilities of real IEE enabled machines. We recall this interface:
– Init(1λ) is the global initialisation procedure which, on input the security parameter,
outputs the global parameters prms. This algorithm represents the machine’s hard-
ware initialisation procedure, which is out of the user’s and the adversary’s control.
Intuitively, it initialises the internal security module, the internal state of the remote
machine and returns any public cryptographic parameters that the security module
releases. The global parameters of machines are assumed to be authenticated using
external mechanisms, such as a PKI.
– Load(P ) is the IEE initialisation procedure. On input a program/transition function
P , the machine produces a fresh handle hdl, creates a new IEE with handle hdl, loads
P into the new IEE and returns hdl. The machine interface does not provide direct
access to either the internal state of an IEE nor to its randomness input. This means
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that the only information that is leaked about internal state and randomness input is
that revealed (indirectly) via the outputs of the program.
– Run(hdl, l, i) is the process activation procedure. On input a handle hdl and a label-
input pair (l, i), it will activate process running in isolated execution environment of
handle hdl with (l, i) as the next input. When the program/transition function pro-
duces the next output o, this is returned to the caller.
B.1 Program composition
We extend the basic notion of program composition in [3] to consider the two general
label-based forms of program composition shown in Fig. 4 that can be applied recur-
sively and interchangeably to create arbitrarily complex programs in a modular way.
Program 〈P1 | . . . |Pn〉p1,...,pn [st](l, i):
If st =  :
For i ∈ [1..n] : st.finished.pi ← F; st.pi ← 
If (∧ni=1 st.finished.pi) : Return 
If ∃k ∈ [1..n] s.t. l = (pk, l′) :
If ¬st.finished.pk :
o←$ Pk[st.pk](l′, i)
st.finished.pk ← o.finished
Else: o← 
Else: o←⊥
Return (∧ni=1 st.finished.pi, o)
Program 〈P ; Q〉φ,p,q [st](l, i):
If st =  :
st.stage← 0; st.finished← F st.st′ ← 
If st.finished : Return 
If st.stage = 0 ∧ l = (p, l′) :
o←$ P [st.st′](l′, i)
If o.finished : st.stage← 1; st.st′ ← φ(st.st′)
Else:
If st.stage = 1 ∧ l = (q, l′) :
o←$ Q[st.st′](l′, i)
st.finished← o.finished
Else: o←⊥
Return (st.stage, st.finished, o)
Fig. 4. Parallel (left) and sequential (right) program composition.
By parallel composition of programs P1, . . . Pn, denoted 〈P1 | . . . |Pn〉p1,...,pn , we
mean the transition function that takes inputs with extended labels of the form (pi, l)7—
here pi are bitstrings used to identify the target program, where we assume pi 6= pj for
i, j distinct—and dispatches incoming label-input pairs to the appropriate program.
In parallel composition we exclude the possibility of state sharing between programs,
and define termination to occur when all composed programs have terminated. By se-
quential composition of two programs P and Q via projection function φ, denoted
〈P ;Q〉φ,p,q , we mean the transition function that has two execution stages, which are
signaled in its output via an additional stage flag. As above, we will denote by o.stage
the value of this flag in some output o. For consistency, we again assume labels of the
form (p, l) and (q, l) where p 6= q are used to identify the target program. In the first
stage, every label-input pair will be checked for consistency (i.e., that it indicates P
as the target program) and dispatched to program P . This will proceed until P ’s last
output indicates it has finished (inclusively). The next activation will trigger the start of
the second stage, at which point the composed program initialises the state of Q using
φ(stP ) before activating it for the first time. Additionally we require that a constant in-
dicating the current stage is appended to any output of a composition. We do not admit
other state sharing between P and Q in addition to that fixed by φ.
7 We assume some form of non-ambiguous encoding of composed labels and output strings, but
in our presentation we simply present these encoded values as tuples.
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C Definitions
C.1 Cryptographic definitions
Message Authentication Codes SYNTAX. A message authentication code scheme Π
is a triple of PPT algorithms (Gen, Auth, Ver). On input 1λ, where λ is the security
parameter, the randomized key generation algorithm returns a fresh key. On input key
and message m, the deterministic MAC algorithm Auth returns a tag t. On input key, m
and t, the deterministic verification algorithm Ver returns T or F indicating whether t is
a valid MAC for m relative to key. We require that, for all λ ∈ N, all key ∈ [Gen(1λ)]
and all m, it is the case that Ver(key,m, (Auth(key,m))) = T.
SECURITY. We use the standard notion of existential unforgeability for MACs [6]. We
say that Π is existentially unforgeable if AdvAuthA,Π (λ) is negligible for every ppt adversary
A, where advantage is defined as the probability that the game in Figure 5 (top) returns
T.
Digital Signature Schemes SYNTAX. A signature scheme Σ is a triple of PPT al-
gorithms (Gen,Sign,Vrfy). On input 1λ, where λ is the security parameter, the ran-
domized key generation algorithm returns a fresh key pair (pk, sk). On input secret
key sk and message m, the possibly randomized signing algorithm Sign returns a sig-
nature σ. On input public key pk, m and σ, the deterministic verification algorithm
Vrfy returns T or F indicating whether σ is a valid signature for m relative to pk.
We require that, for all λ ∈ N, all (pk, sk) ∈ [Gen(1λ)] and all m, it is the case that
Vrfy(pk,m, (Sign(sk,m))) = T.
SECURITY. We use the standard notion of existential unforgeability for signature schemes [25].
We say that Σ is existentially unforgeable if AdvUFA,Σ(λ) is negligible for every ppt ad-
versary A, where advantage is defined as the probability that the game in Figure 5
(bottom) returns T.
Authenticated Encryption Schemes SYNTAX. An authenticated encryption scheme
Λ is a triple of PPT algorithms (Gen, Enc, Dec). On input 1λ, where λ is the security pa-
rameter, the randomized key generation algorithm returns a fresh key. On input key key
and message m, the randomized encryption algorithm Enc returns a ciphertext m′. On
input key key and ciphertext m′, the deterministic decryption algorithm Dec returns the
decrypted message m, or ⊥ if the ciphertext is found to be invalid. We require that, for
all λ ∈ N, all key ∈ [Gen(1λ)] and all m, it is the case that m = Dec(key,Enc(key,m)).
SECURITY. We use the standard notions of indistinguishability and existential unforge-
ability for authenticated encryption schemes [32]. We say that Λ provides ciphertext
indistinguishability if AdvINDA,Λ(λ) is negligible for every ppt adversary A, where ad-
vantage is defined as the probability that the game in Figure 6 (top) returns T over the
random guess. We say that Λ is existentially unforgeable if AdvUFA,Λ(λ) is negligible for
every ppt adversary A, where advantage is defined as the probability that the game in
Figure 6 (bottom) returns T.
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Game AuthΠ,A(1λ):
List← []
key←$ Gen(1λ)
(m, t)←$ AAuth(1λ)
Return Ver(key,m, t) = T ∧m 6∈ List
Oracle Auth(m):
List← (m : List)
t← Mac(key,m)
Return t
Game UFΣ,A(1λ):
List← []
(pk, sk)←$ Gen(1λ)
(m, σ)←$ ASign(1λ, pk)
Return Vrfy(pk,m, σ) = T ∧m 6∈ List
Oracle Sign(m):
List← (m : List)
σ ← Sign(sk,m)
Return σ
Fig. 5. Games defining the security of a MAC scheme (left) and a signature scheme (right).
Game INDΛ,A(1λ):
List← []
key←$ Gen(1λ)
(m0,m1)←$ AEncrypt,Decrypt1 (1λ)
b←$ {0, 1}
m′←$ Enc(key,mb)
b′←$ AEncrypt,Decrypt2 (m0,m1,m′)
If m′ ∈ List: b′←$ {0, 1}
Return b = b′
Oracle Encrypt(m):
Return Enc(key,m)
Oracle Decrypt(m′):
List← (m′ : List)
m← Dec(key,m′)
Return m
Game UFΛ,A(1λ):
List← []
key←$ Gen(1λ)
m′←$ AEncrypt(1λ)
If Dec(key,m′) 6=⊥ ∧m′ 6∈ List:
Return T
Return F
Oracle Encrypt(m):
m′ ← Sign(sk,m)
List← (m′ : List)
Return m′
Fig. 6. Games defining ciphertext indistinguishability (top) and existential unforgeability (bot-
tom) of an authenticated encryption scheme.
C.2 Key Exchange
We recall here the notion of Key Exchange for Attested Computation (AttKE) from [3].
This notion is tailored to establish a secure key with a remote program running inside
an IEE; the remote program includes a first stage where the key is derived using a key
exchange subprogram called RemKE and an arbitrary second stage program that uses the
derived key. Active security in the key exchange protocol is achieved by running RemKE
using attestation mechanisms provided by the IEE. We will see in this paper that the
exact same notion of AttKE can be used together with Labelled Attested Computation in
a much wider program composition context and, particularly, to enable multiple parties
to establish independent secure channels to the same IEE.
SYNTAX. An AttKE is defined as a pair of algorithms (Setup, LocKE). On input the
security parameter 1λ and the local party identity id, Setup generates the part of the key
exchange intended for remote execution RemKE, and the initial state stL of the local
part of the key exchange LocKE. Setup is intended to generate a fresh instance of the
AttKE protocol between the party with identity id and a remote IEE. The dynamically
generated RemKE will be run remotely in an IEE, under the protection of a LAC scheme,
following some composition pattern. On input m and local state stL, LocKE returns the
next message intended for the remote part of the key exchange and an updated state.
We require the local and remote parts of an AttKE to keep a set of variables in their
states. The execution state of the AttKE is kept as δ ∈ {derived, accept, reject,⊥}.
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The derived key is stored as key. It is supposed to be ⊥ if δ 6∈ {derived, accept}. The
identity of the owner of the instance is represented as oid. This will be initialised on the
fly for the remote part. The identity of the partner of the session is stored in variable
pid. This will typically be set at generation for RemKE and constructed during execution
for LocKE. Finally the session identifier sid, will typically be constructed on the fly. An
AttKE is correct if, after an honest run of a local instance and the corresponding remote
instance, both accept, derive the same key and agree on sid, pid and oid.
SECURITY. The adversary model for AttKE security is tailored so that active security is
provided when adding attestation to the remote part. This adversary is a middle ground
between a passive and an active adversary. The security model considers an adversary
which has access to oracles whose behaviour depend on a bit b and a list of pairs of real
and fake keys, one for each instance. In addition to the oracles initialising new local and
remote instances (multiple instances of the same remote instance can be created), the
following oracles are provided:
– Reveal: when queried on a local or remote instance, it returns the corresponding de-
rived key.
– Test: when queried on a local or remote instance, it returns ⊥ if δ 6= accept; other-
wise, if b = 0 it returns key and it returns fake(key) if b = 1.
– Send allows delivering messages between instances, making sure that messages from
remote instances to local instances are reliably delivered. The messages delivered to
remote instances, however, are arbitrary. This oracle updates the instances according
to the message delivered and returns the response, together with the corresponding
pid, sid and δ.
The model keeps track of local instances LoclKE created by the local identity id and
remote instances Remi,jKE (there can be many copies of RemKE for each locally initialized
session. A local and a remote instance are partnered if δi,j , δl ∈ {derived, accept} and
they agree on sid. We further restrict the adversary, by disallowing Test queries if Reveal
was queried for this instance or a partnered instance.
We say that a protocol ensures valid partners if, for every partnered LoclKE and
Remi,jKE, pid
l = oidi,j , oidl = pidi,j and the derived key is the same for both instances.
We say that a protocol ensures confirmed partners if when an instance of the key ex-
change accepts, it has at least one partner. We say that a protocol ensure unique partners
if each instance is partnered with at most one other instance. A protocol ensures two
sided authentication if it ensures these three properties with overwhelming probability,
in the presence of an adversary with access to the aforementioned oracles.
Definition 3 (AttKE security). An AttKE protocol is secure if the protocol ensures
two sided authentication, and for any ppt adversaryA, as described above, and for any
local identity id, the probability of A guessing b is overwhelmingly close to 1/2.
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D LAC correctness and minimal leakage
D.1 Correctness definition
Intuitively, a LAC scheme is correct if, for any given program P and attested label
set L∗, assuming an honest execution of all components in the scheme, both locally
and remotely, the local user is able to accurately reconstruct a partial view of the I/O
sequence that took place in the remote environment, for an arbitrary set of labels L
(which may or may not be related to L∗). For non-attested labels, i.e., labels in L \
L∗, we restrict the I/O behaviour of the compiled program inside the IEE imposing
that it is identical to that of the original program. For this reason, the set of labels L
should be seen as a parameter that can be used by higher level protocols relying on
LAC to specify the partial local view that may interest a particular party interacting
with a remote machine. Different parties may be interested in different partial views,
including both attested an non-attested labels, and the protocol should be correct for all
of them. More technically, suppose the compiled program is run under handle hdl∗ in
remote machineM, with random coins CoinsM(hdl∗) and on labelled input sequence
(l1, i1, . . . , ln, in). Suppose also that, running the original program on the same random
coins and inputs yields
TraceR[st;CoinsM(hdl∗)](l1, i1, . . . , ln, in) =
(l1, i1, on, . . . , ln, in, on)
Then, for any set of labels L, if a local user recovers outputs (o′1, . . . , o
′
m) cor-
responding to labelled inputs (lk1 , ik1) to (lkm , ikm), where lkj ∈ L, it must be the
case that (o′1, . . . , o
′
m) = (ok1 , . . . , okm). Outputs for attested labels are passed through
Attest and Verify, whereas inputs and outputs for non-attested labels are processed in-
dependently of these algorithms. The following definition formalizes the notion of a
local user correctly remotely executing program P using labelled attested computation.
Game CorrLAC,A(1λ):
prms←$M.Init(1λ)
(P,L∗, L, n, stA)←$ A1(prms)
P∗ ← Compile(prms, P, L∗)
hdl∗ ←M.Load(P∗)
stV ← (prms, P, L∗)
For k ∈ [1..n] :
(lk, ik, stA)←$ A2(o∗1 , . . . , o∗k−1, stA)
If lk ∈ L ∩ L∗ :
o∗k←$ AttestM(prms, hdl∗, lk, ik)
(ok, stV )← Verify(prms, lk, ik, o∗k, stV )
If ok =⊥ Then Return F
Else If lk ∈ L \ L∗ :
ok←$M.Run(hdl∗, lk, ik)
Else Return F
T ′ ← filter[L](TraceP [st;CoinsM(hdl∗)](l1, i1, . . . , ln, in))
T ← filter[L](l1, i1, o1, . . . , ln, in, on) // get only labels in L
Return T = T ′
Fig. 7. Game defining the correctness of LAC.
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Definition 4 (Correctness). A labelled attested computation scheme LAC is correct if,
for all λ and all adversaries A, the experiment in Fig. 7 always returns T.
The adversary in this correctness experiment definition is choosing inputs, hoping
to find a sequence that causes the attestation protocol to behave inconsistently with re-
spect to the semantics of P (when these are made deterministic by hardwiring the same
random coins used remotely). We use this approach to defining correctness because it
makes explicit what is an honest execution of an attested computation scheme, when
compared to the security experiment.
STRUCTURAL PRESERVATION. To simplify analysis of our constructions and proofs,
we extend the correctness requirements on labelled attested computation schemes to
preserve the structure of the input program when dealing with sequential composition,
and to modify only the part of the code that will be attested. Formally, we impose that,
for all global parameters, given any program R = 〈P ; Q〉φ,p,q , and an attested label
set L∗ that contains only labels of the form (p, l), then there exists a (unique) compiled
program P ∗, such that, 〈P ∗ ; Q〉φ,p,q = Compile(prms, R, L) . Note that this implies
that the state of compiled program P ∗ somehow encodes the state of P in a way that is
transparent for φ, and we will loosely rely on this when referring to the execution state
of P ∗ and extracting values from it. Note also that, for composed programs compiled
in this way, the unnatested I/O behaviour of the second program will be identical to that
of the original program.
D.2 Minimal Leakage
The following definition imposes that nothing from the internal state of the source pro-
grams (in addition to what is public, i.e., the code and I/O sequence) is leaked in the
trace of the compiled program.
Definition 5 (Minimal leakage). A labelled attested computation scheme LAC ensures
security with minimal leakage if it is secure according to Definition 1 and there exists a
ppt simulator S that, for every adversary A, the following distributions are identical:
{ Leak-RealLAC,A(1λ) } ≈ { Leak-IdealLAC,A,S(1λ) }
where games Leak-RealLAC,A and Leak-IdealLAC,A,S are shown in Fig. 8.
Notice that we allow the simulator to replace the global parameters of the machine
with some value prms for which it can keep some trapdoor information. Intuitively
this means that one can construct a perfect simulation of the remote trace by simply
appending cryptographic material to the local trace. This property is important when
claiming that the security of a cryptographic primitive is preserved when it is run within
an attested computation scheme (one can simply reduce the advantage of an adversary
attacking the attested trace, to the security of the original scheme using the minimum
leakage simulator).
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Game Leak-RealLAC,A(1λ):
PrgList← [ ]
prms←$M.Init(1λ)
b←$ AO(prms)
Return b
Oracle Run(hdl, l, i):
ReturnM.Run(hdl, l, i)
Oracle Compile(P,L):
P∗ ← Compile(prms, P, L)
PrgList← P∗ : PrgList
Return P∗
Oracle Load(P ):
ReturnM.Load(P )
Game Leak-IdealLAC,A,S(1λ):
PrgList← [ ]; List← [ ]
hdl← 0
(prms, stS)←$ S1(1λ)
b←$ AO(prms)
Return b
Oracle Run(hdl, l, i):
(P∗, st)← List[hdl]
If (P∗, L, P ) ∈ PrgList :
o←$ P [st](l, i)
(o∗, stS)←$ S2(hdl, P, L, l, i, o, stS)
Else:
(o∗, stS)←$ S3(hdl, P∗, l, i, st, stS)
List[hdl]← (P∗, st)
Return o∗
Oracle Compile(P,L):
P∗ ← Compile(prms, P, L)
PrgList← (P∗, L, P ) : PrgList
Return P∗
Oracle Load(P∗):
hdl← hdl + 1
List[hdl]← (P∗, )
Return hdl
Fig. 8. Games defining minimum leakage of LAC.
D.3 Correctness of our LAC scheme
It is easy to see that our LAC scheme is correct, provided that the underlying signature
and message authentication schemes are correct, and that it preserves the structure of
compiled programs. To see that this is the case, note that during the execution of P ∗
for lk ∈ L, unless a MAC or signature verification fails, the I/O sequence provided by
Verify will match the one reconstructed in T ′ (the inputs are the same, and the associ-
ated randomness tapes are fixed by CoinsM(hdl∗)), and therefore T = T ′. Since these
algorithms are only used for attested labels, we only need to consider this possibility for
labels l ∈ L∗ ∩ L. Now, observe that if the message authentication code scheme is cor-
rect, then the MAC verification will never fail, and if the message signature scheme is
correct, then the signature verification will never fail. This is the case because the com-
bined operations of P ∗, Attest, the signing IEE running S∗ and the security module
lead to tags and signatures on pairs (P ∗, iosl) that exactly match the inputs provided to
the verification algorithms in Π.Ver and Σ.Verify. This gives us that the received trace
and the reconstructed trace will be the same for all labels in L.
E Proof of Theorem 1
The proof is a sequence of three games presented in Figure 9 and Figure 10. The first
game is simply the LAC security game instantiated with our protocol.
In game G1AC,A(1λ), the adversary loses whenever a sforge event occurs. Intu-
itively, this event corresponds to the adversary producing a signature that was not com-
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puted by the signing process with handle 0, and hence constitutes a forgery with respect
to Σ. Given that the two games are identical until this event occurs, we have that
Pr[AttLAC,A(1λ)⇒ T ]− Pr[G1LAC,A(1λ)⇒ T ] ≤ Pr[ sforge ] .
Game G0LAC,A(1λ):
prms←$M.Init(1λ)
(P,L∗, l, n, stA)←$ A1(prms)
P∗ ← Compile(prms, P, L∗)
For k ∈ [1..n]:
(ik, o
∗
k, stA)←$ AM2 (stV , stA)
Parse (ok, σ)← o∗k
If Σ.Vrfy(prms, σ, (P∗, filter[l]((l, ik, ok) : ios))):
ios← ((l, ik, ok) : ios)
Else: Return F
T ← (l, i1, o1, . . . , l, in, on)
For hdl∗ s.t. ProgramM(hdl
∗) = P∗
(l′1, i
′
1, o
′
1, . . . , l
′
m, i
′
m, o
′
m)← TraceMR (hdl∗)
T ′ ← filter[l](TraceP [st;CoinsM(hdl∗)](l
′
1, i
′
1, . . . , l
′
m, i
′
m))
If T v T ′ Return F
Return T
Game G1LAC,A(1λ):
prms←$M.Init(1λ)
(P,L∗, l, n, stA)←$ A1(prms)
sforge← F
P∗ ← Compile(prms, P, L∗)
For k ∈ [1..n]:
(ik, o
∗
k, stA)←$ AM2 (stV , stA)
Parse (ok, σ)← o∗k
If Σ.Vrfy(prms, σ, (P∗, filter[l]((l, ik, ok) : ios))):
ios← ((l, ik, ok) : ios)
Else: Return F
If ((P∗, (l, i1, o1, . . . , l, ik, ok), ?), σ′) 6∈ TraceM(0):
sforge← T; Return F
T ← (l, i1, o1, . . . , l, in, on)
For hdl∗ s.t. ProgramM(hdl
∗) = P∗
(l′1, i
′
1, o
′
1, . . . , l
′
m, i
′
m, o
′
m)← TraceMR (hdl∗)
T ′ ← filter[l](TraceP [st;CoinsM(hdl∗)](l
′
1, i
′
1, . . . , l
′
m, i
′
m))
If T v T ′ Return F
Return T
Fig. 9. First game hop for the proof of security of our AC protocol.
We upper bound the distance between these two games, by constructing an adversary B
against the existential unforgeability of signature scheme Σ in S∗ such that
Pr[ sforge ] ≤ AdvUFΣ,B(λ)
AdversaryB simulates the environment of G1LAC,A as follows: the operation of machine
M is simulated exactly with the caveat that the signing operations performed within
the process loaded by the security module are replaced with calls to the Sign oracle
provided in the existential unforgeability game. More precisely, whenever process 0 in
the remote machine is expected to compute a signature on message m, algorithm B calls
its own oracle on (P ∗,m) to obtain σ.
When sforge is set, according to the rules of game G1LAC,A, algorithm B outputs
message (P ∗, filter[l](ios)) and candidate signature σ. It remains to show that this is
a valid forgery. To see this, first observe that this is indeed a valid signature, as sig-
nature verification is performed on these values immediately before sforge occurs. It
suffices to establish that message (P ∗, (l, i1, o1, . . . , l, ik, ok)) could not have been
queried from the Sign oracle. Access to the signing key that allows signatures to be
performed is only permitted to the special process with handle 0. From the construction
of S∗, we know that producing such a signature would only occur via the inclusion
of (P ∗, (l, i1, o1, . . . , l, ik, ok)) in its trace. Since we know that this is not the case,
(P ∗, filter[l](ios)) could not have been queried from the signature oracle. We conclude
therefore that B outputs a valid forgery whenever sforge occurs.
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In game G2LAC,A(1λ), the adversary loses whenever a mforge event occurs. Intu-
itively, this event corresponds to the adversary producing a tag that was not computed
by the security module, and hence constitutes a forgery with respect to Π. Given that
the two games are identical until this event occurs, we have that
Pr[G1LAC,A(1λ)⇒ T ]− Pr[G2LAC,A(1λ)⇒ T ] ≤ Pr[mforge ] .
Game G1LAC,A(1λ):
prms←$M.Init(1λ)
(P,L∗, l, n, stA)←$ A1(prms)
sforge← F
P∗ ← Compile(prms, P, L∗)
For k ∈ [1..n]:
(ik, o
∗
k, stA)←$ AM2 (stV , stA)
Parse (ok, σ)← o∗k
If Σ.Vrfy(prms, σ, (P∗, filter[l]((l, ik, ok) : ios))):
ios← ((l, ik, ok) : ios)
Else: Return F
If ((P∗, (l, i1, o1, . . . , l, ik, ok), ?), σ′) 6∈ TraceM(0):
sforge← T; Return F
T ← (l, i1, o1, . . . , l, in, on)
For hdl∗ s.t. ProgramM(hdl
∗) = P∗
(l′1, i
′
1, o
′
1, . . . , l
′
m, i
′
m, o
′
m)← TraceMR (hdl∗)
T ′ ← filter[l](TraceP [st;CoinsM(hdl∗)](l
′
1, i
′
1, . . . , l
′
m, i
′
m))
If T v T ′ Return F
Return T
Game G2LAC,A(1λ):
prms←$M.Init(1λ)
(P,L∗, l, n, stA)←$ A1(prms)
sforge← F; mforge← F
P∗ ← Compile(prms, P, L∗)
For k ∈ [1..n]:
(ik, o
∗
k, stA)←$ AM2 (stV , stA)
Parse (ok, σ)← o∗k
If Σ.Vrfy(prms, σ, (P∗, filter[l]((l, ik, ok) : ios))):
ios← ((l, ik, ok) : ios)
Else: Return F
If ((P∗, (l, i1, o1, . . . , l, ik, ok), ?), σ′) 6∈ TraceM(0):
sforge← T; Return F
If 6 ∃ hdl∗. ProgramM(hdl∗) = P∗ ∧
(l, i1, o1, . . . , l, ik, ok) v filter[l](TraceP [st;CoinsM(hdl∗)](TraceM(hdl
∗)):
Then mforge← T; Return F
T ← (l, i1, o1, . . . , l, in, on)
For hdl∗ s.t. ProgramM(hdl
∗) = P∗
(l′1, i
′
1, o
′
1, . . . , l
′
m, i
′
m, o
′
m)← TraceMR (hdl∗)
T ′ ← filter[l](TraceP [st;CoinsM(hdl∗)](l
′
1, i
′
1, . . . , l
′
m, i
′
m))
If T v T ′ Return F
Return T
Fig. 10. Second game hop for the proof of security of our AC protocol.
We upper bound the distance between these two games, by constructing an adversary
C against the existential unforgeability of MAC scheme Π in the security module such
that
Pr[mforge ] ≤ AdvAuthΠ,C (λ)
Adversary C simulates the environment of G2LAC,A as follows: the operation of ma-
chineM is simulated exactly with the caveat that the MAC operations computed inside
the internal security module are replaced with calls to the Auth oracle provided in the
existential unforgeability game. More precisely, whenever a process running code R∗
within an IEE in the remote machine requests a MAC on message m from the security
module, algorithm C calls its own oracle on (P ∗,m) to obtain t.
Let T ← (l, i1, o1, . . . , l, ik, ok). When mforge is set according to the rules of game
G2
LAC,A, algorithm C retrieves the trace of the process with handle 0 running S∗, lo-
cates the input/output pair (((P ∗, T ), t), σ′) and outputs message (P ∗, T ) and candi-
date tag t. To see this is a valid forgery, first observe that, having failed the sforge
check, we know that (((P ∗, T ), t), σ′) is in the trace of the process with handle 0, so
by its construction we also know that the corresponding input ((P ∗, T ), t) must contain
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a valid tag. It suffices to establish that message (P ∗, T ) could not have been queried
from the Auth oracle. Suppose that the first part of the mforge check failed, i.e., that
6 ∃ hdl∗. ProgramM(hdl∗) = P ∗. Then, because the security module signs the code of
the processes requesting the signatures, we are sure that such a query was never placed
to the Auth oracle. Furthermore, any MAC query for a message starting with P ∗ must
have been caused by the execution of an instance of P ∗. Now suppose some instances
of P ∗ were indeed running in the remote machine, but that none of them displayed
the property (l, i1, o1, . . . , l, ik, ok) v filter[l](Translate(ATraceM(hdl∗))). Then, by
the construction of P ∗, we can also exclude that (P ∗, T ) was queried from the MAC
oracle. As such, we conclude that C outputs a valid forgery whenever mforge occurs.
To complete the proof, we argue that the adversary never wins in game G2LAC,A. To
see this, observe that when the game reaches the final check, we have the guarantee that
∃ hdl∗. ProgramM(hdl∗) = P ∗ ∧
(l, i1, o1, . . . , l, in, on) v filter[l](TraceP [st;CoinsM(hdl∗)](TraceM(hdl∗))
Which exactly matches the final criteria of T v T ′.
To finish the proof, we must now show that this scheme also provides security with
minimum leakage. This implies defining a ppt simulator S that provides identical dis-
tributions with respect to experiment in Figure 8. This is easy to ascertain given the
simulator behaviour described in Figure 11: S1 and S3 follow the exact description of
the actual machine, modulo the generation of (pk, sk) and key. S2 takes an external out-
put produced by P [st](l, i) and returns an output in accordance to the behaviour ofM,
which given our language Lmay differ from a real output only by the random coins. As
such, the distribution provided by the simulator is indistinguishable to the one provided
by a real machine, and our claim follows.
uunionsq
F MPC definitions
F.1 MPC correctness
The following definition formalizes the notion of n users correctly running a function
evaluation protocol pi for F.
Definition 6. We say pi is correct for functionality F on m inputs in r rounds if, for all
λ, and all adversaries A, the experiment in Figure 12 always returns T.
DISCUSSION. Our correctness definition considers an honest execution environment,
but includes a correctness adversary that is in charge of finding problematic inputs for
the protocol and potentially erroneous execution schedules. It is parametrized by a num-
ber of inputs m and a number of rounds r.
The first stage of the experiment executes the Setup and Init algorithms that ini-
tialise both the remote machine and the parties’ local states, and collects the public
parameters for all of these participants (which we assume to be authenticated through
29
Simulator S = {S1,S2,S3}
Simulator S will perform according to theM execution description.
– Upon input 1λ, S1 generates a key pair for process S∗, a MAC key for the security module and initializes the
traces and states as an empty list. The public key will be the public parameters, while the secret key be stored in its
initial state.
S1(1λ):
key←$ Π.Gen(1λ)
(pk, sk)←$ Σ.Gen(1λ)
Traces← [ ]
Return (pk, (key, sk,Traces))
– S2 maintains a list of traces Traces with the respective list ios and stage stage. Given this, it masks output o∗ as if
produced by an actual machine execution.
S2(hdl, P, L, l, i, o∗, stS):
Parse (key, sk,Traces)← stS
If Traces[hdl] 6= [ ]: ios← Traces[hdl]
Else: ios← [ ]
If l ∈ L∗:
ios← (l, i, o∗) : ios
m← (o∗,Π.Mac(key, P, filter[l](ios)))
Else: m← o∗
Traces[hdl]← ios; stS ← (key, sk,Traces)
Return (m, stS)
– S3 standardly computes the next output given input i, program R and state st. Sim(P∗[st], l, i, ios, key) refers
to the operation of executing P∗ with label l and input i for trace ios and considering a security module with key
key, producing output m and updated trace ios. The result is afterwards treated similar to S2.
S3(hdl, P∗, l, i, st, stS):
Parse (key, sk,Traces)← stS
If hdl = 0:
Parse (m, t)← i∗
If Π.Ver(key, t,m): Return Σ.Sign(sk,m)
Else Return⊥
If Traces[hdl] 6= [ ]: ios← Traces[hdl]
Else: ios← [ ]
L← labels(P∗)
(m, ios)←$ Sim(P∗[st], l, i, ios, key)
Traces[hdl]← ios; stS ← (key, sk,Traces)
Return (m, stS)
Fig. 11. Description of simulator S
the paper, e.g., using a PKI). In the second part of the experiment, the adversary chooses
a sequence ofm inputs for the functionality, interleaving different parties in an arbitrary
way. The sequence (id1, . . . , idm) implicitly defines a schedule for the execution of our
protocol, which should ensure that the inputs of each party are provided to the function-
ality in precisely this order.
The last stage of the correctness experiment emulates the protocol execution, al-
ternating between local steps and remote steps. The Remote algorithm commands the
scheduling of message exchanges; this algorithm is always invoked first and its output
indicates the next party to be activated, the message this party will receive, and whether
or not the party is expected to provide an input. The protocol is run for r rounds, at
which point its outputs are retrieved via Output. The adversary wins the game if it can
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force the game to produce a set of outputs that wouldn’t be obtained by simply running
the functionality F with the given inputs in the provided order.
Game CorrF,pi,r,m,A,M(1λ):
/Trusted setup of machine and parties
(n, F, Lin, Lout)← F
prms←$M.Init(1λ)
For id ∈ [1..n]:
(stid, pubid)←$ Setup(prms, id)
Pub← (pub1, . . . , pubn)
For id ∈ [1..n]:
stid←$ Init(stid,Pub)
outidi ← 
/Adversarially scheduled ideal execution
stF ← ; stA ← 
For i ∈ [1..m]:
(idi, ini, stA)←$ A(prms,Pub, stA)
outidi ← outidi || F[stF](idi, ini)
/Protocol execution
F∗ ← Compile(prms,F,Pub)
hdl←M.Load(F∗)
t← T; m← ; j ← 0
stR ← (id1, . . . , idm)/input schedule
For i ∈ [1..r]:
If t:/Remote step
(id, inreq,m′, stR)←$ RemoteM(prms, hdl,m, stR)
Else:/Local step
If inreq = T:
If id 6= idj Return F
stid←$ AddInput(inj , stid)
j ← j + 1
(stid,m)←$ Process(stid,m′)
t← ¬t
For id ∈ [1..n]:
out′1 ← Output(stid)
Return (out1, . . . , outn) = (out′1, . . . , out
′
n)
Fig. 12. Game defining protocol correctness.
REMARK. The correctness experiment shows the crucial scheduling role of the Remote
algorithm, which is run in an untrusted environment in the remote machine. Here we
deviate from the standard approach in the UC setting, where the simulation-based def-
inition of security is taken as providing sufficient detail to evaluate correctness of the
protocol. Indeed, as other simulation-based definitions, our security experiment below
will impose some input/output consistency conditions on the protocol. Intuitively, these
must hold for any adversarially chosen Remote scheduling algorithm, as the adversary
has full control of the remote machine and scheduling can be arbitrarily controlled by
the attacker. However, we believe that there is added value in including a separate cor-
rectness definition, where the scheduling tasks of the non-security critical parts of the
protocol can be specified as a first class feature of the protocol syntax. This also clarifies
the envisioned execution model and makes it explicit that untrusted code running in an
adversarially run machine is only relevant for correctness purposes.
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G MPC protocol definitions
G.1 AttKE and utility
We define utility almost as in the AC case from [3]. The main difference is the composi-
tion context we allow for. In [3] the composition context is restricted to a key exchange
composed sequentially with another program. Here we allow for the key exchange to be
composed in parallel with other arbitrary programs and then sequentially with another
program. The proof follows the same lines. The utility security experiment intuitively
states that the adversary cannot distinguish between a derived key and a random key,
whenever the key exchange has been performed between an honest party and a remote
machine running RemKE within an IEE, and RemKE is composed with other arbitrary
programs as described above. The reason this parallel/sequential composition pattern
does not harm security is that the parts of the state belonging to different parallel-
composed programs are disjoint, and sequential composition only reveals controlled
information to other programs. Indeed, as in [3], we restrict sequential composition
in the utility theorem to pass only specific parts of the state of the key exchange pro-
gram to the following phase: mapping function φkey passes on the derived key, the
session and party identifiers, and the state (derived or accept) of the key exchange.
Contrary to [3] this is not enough to define our mapping function, as other programs
composed in parallel with the remote key exchange need to pass states to the next phase
as well. To that extent, if φ1, . . . , φn are mapping functions, we define φl11 | . . . |φlnn as
φ∗ := st.li 7→ φi(st.li). If the state comes from the program 〈P1| . . . |Pn〉(l1,...,ln), this
mapping function maps the state belonging to each Pi using φi. In our composition
context, we take the φi corresponding to the key exchange to be φkey. This ensures that
only the key is transmitted to the following stage of the protocol, and not information
supposed to be local to the key exchange protocol and not intended for further use.
In the experiment in Figure 13 the adversary has to distinguish between an ideal
machine and a real world machine where an AttKE is run in parallel with other pro-
grams in the first phase of a LAC-compiled protocol. The machine M represents the
remote machine expected by the LAC protocol and the machineM′ is a modification of
machineM in which the key derived by a key-exchange session is magically replaced
by a fresh key. In order to maintain consistency between the tested keys and the keys
used inM′, oracleM′.Run takes two additional parameters: a list fake of pairs of keys
and a flag tweak. If the flag is activated, the following modifications in the behaviour of
M occur inM′:
– It expects the sub-program being activated due to input label l to be a key exchange
RemKE instance. After running its transition function,M′ checks if it has reached the
derived or accept state. If so, it retrieves the derived key and if there is no association
(key, _) in fake it generates a fresh key key∗ and appends (key, key∗) to fake.
– Furthermore, if the key exchange process has entered accept state, it performs st.l.key←
fake(key), i.e., it replaces the derived key with a fake random one. Note that this will
cause the fake key to be passed to the next stage of the sequentially composed pro-
gram.
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The oracles provided to the adversary provide access to the remote machine. Addi-
tionally the adversary can create new sessions of the key exchange using the NewSession
oracle, where the remote key exchange is composed in parallel (with label l∗) with
programs P1, . . . , Pn, followed with Q and compiled for LAC. Note that, given the
structure of our parallel composition, the position in which a program is listed in the
composition expression is irrelevant. The adversary makes the local part of the key ex-
change progress by using the Send oracle, provided that the message passes the LAC
verification step for the relevant label. Finally the adversary can challenge a session by
executing the Test oracle, which return either the real key of a fake key according to b
(provided that the key exchange has reached a derived or accept state).
Theorem 3 (Local AttKE utility). If the AttKE is correct and secure, and the LAC
protocol is correct, secure and ensures minimal leakage, then for all ppt adversaries
in the labelled utility experiment: the probability that the adversary violates the At-
tKE two-sided entity authentication is negligible; and the key secrecy advantage 2 ·
Pr[guess]− 1 is negligible.
G.2 Details of the protocol
Details of the protocol can be found in Figure 14. The (untrusted) scheduling algo-
rithm is shown in Figure 15. It is in charge of dispatching messages to/from the remote
machine IEE using the Attest algorithm provided by the LAC, and animating the proto-
col to generate a correct execution for an arbitrary sequence of input-party interactions
provided externally as an input schedule which is stored in its initial state. During the
bootstrap stage, the Remote procedure interacts with one party at a time,8 moving from
one party to the next when the previous party has moved to its second stage. When
all parties have completed the key exchange, the Remote procedure detects this in the
output of the IEE (consistently with the properties of our sequential composition), and
moves to the functionality execution stage.
In this second stage, the algorithm simply follows the provided input schedule.
Moving to the next input is triggered by feeding the algorithm with an empty input
provided by the previous party (this is syntactic book-keeping to match our correctness
requirement, and it signals the fact that the previous output was correctly delivered to
the previous party). The consequence of such an action is that Remote signals that a
new input should be requested from the next party in the schedule. When an actual in-
put is received, this is passed into the IEE using an unattested label of the form (q, id).
The output is sent back to the same party.
H Proof of the Utility Theorem
In [4] the proof of utility, presented in Appendix C consists in a sequence of 4 games
G0AttKE,A to G3AttKE,A. The first hop removes the possibility of an AC forgery, thus
8 Other options were of course possible for implementing Remote, and the core of our protocol
is actually compatible with a totally asynchronous scheduling. Dealing with such issues is out
of the scope of this paper.
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Game AttAttKE,A(1λ, id):
prms0←$M.Init(1λ)
prms1←$M′.Init(1λ)
PrgList← [ ]
fake← [ ]
i← 0
b←$ {0, 1}
b′←$ AO(prmsb)
Return b = b′
Oracle Load(R∗):
hdl0 ←M.Load(R∗)
hdl1 ←M′.Load(R∗)
Return hdlb
Oracle Run(hdl, l, x):
o0←$M.Run(hdl, l, x)
tweak← F
If (ProgramM′ (hdl), l) ∈ PrgList then tweak← T
(o1, fake)←$M′.Run(hdl, l, x, tweak, fake)
Return ob
Oracle Test(i):
If stiKE.δ 6= accept: Return⊥
If b = 0: Return stiKE.key
Else: Return fake(stiKE.key)
Oracle NewSession(P1, l1, φ1, . . . , Pn, ln, φn, l∗, Q, L∗):
If ∃j, k such that j 6= k ∧ lj = lk: Return⊥
If (p, (l∗, )) 6∈ L∗: Return⊥
i← i+ 1
l∗i ← (p, (l∗, ))
(stiKE,Rem
i
KE)←$ Setup(1λ, id)
inilast ← 
RemComp := 〈RemiKE|P1| . . . |Pn〉(l∗,l1,...,ln)
φ∗ := φl
∗
key|φl11 | . . . |φlnn
Ri := 〈RemComp ; Q 〉φ,p,q
R∗i ←$ LAC.Compile(prmsb, Ri, L∗)
stiV ← (R∗i , L∗)
PrgList← (R∗i , l∗i ) : PrgList
ReturnR∗i
Oracle Send(o∗, i):
o← LAC.Verify[stiV ](prms, l∗i , inilast, o∗)
If o =⊥: Return⊥
m∗←$ LocKE[stiKE](o)
inilast ← m∗
If stiKE.δ ∈ {derived, accept} ∧ stiKE.key /∈ fake:
key∗←$ {0, 1}λ
fake← (key, key∗) : fake
Return m∗
Fig. 13. Utility of adversarially composed AttKE.
ensuring that messages are delivered properly from the remote program executing the
key exchange to the local party. The second hop, using minimal leakage, replaces ex-
ecution in the remote machine by a simulated execution based on a real execution of
the compiled program. The final game hop replaces the execution of the remote key
exchange by call to the AttKE security oracles, and conclude immediately by security
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algorithm Setup(prms, id):
stid.id← id; stid.prms← prms
(stL,RemKE)← SetupKE(1λ, id)
stid.stL ← stL; stid.pub← RemKE
Return (stid, stid.pub)
algorithm Compile(prms,F,Pub):
(Rem1KE, . . . ,Rem
n
KE)← Pub
P ← 〈 〈Rem1KE, . . . ,RemnKE〉1,...,n ; Box〈F, Λ〉 〉φkey,p,q
L∗ ← {(p, (1, )), . . . , {(p, (n, ))}/Labels for RemiKE are empty
P∗ ← LAC.Compile(prms, P, L∗)
Return P∗
algorithm Init(stid,Pub):
stid.InList← [ ]; stid.stage← 0;
stid.seqin ← 0; stid.seqout ← 1; stid.inlast ← 
If Pub[stid.id] 6= stid.pub : Return⊥
(Rem1KE, . . . ,Rem
n
KE)← Pub
P ← 〈 〈Rem1KE, . . . ,RemnKE〉1,...,n ; Box〈F, Λ〉 〉φkey,p,q
L← {(p, (stid.id, )), (q, stid.id)}
stid.stV ← (P,L)
Return stid
algorithm Process(stid,m):
/Bootstrap (attested labels)
if stid.stage = 0 :
(i, stid.stV )← LAC.Verify(stid.prms, (p, (stid.id, )), inlast,m, stV )
If i =⊥: Return⊥
(o, stid.stL)←$ LocKE(stid.stL, i)
stid.inlast ← o
If (stid.stL.stKE.δ) = accept : Then stage← 1
m′ ← (stid.stage, stid.id, o)
Return (stid,m′)
/Execution (non-attested labels)
if stid.stage = 1 :
If m =  : /Input requested (empty message signal)
in← stid.InList[0]
(in1, . . . , ink)← stid.ListInid
stid.ListInid ← (in1, . . . , ink-1)
o←$ Λ.Enc(stid.stL.key, (stid.seqin, in))
stid.inlast ← o
stid.seqin ← stid.seqin + 2
m′ ← (stid.stage, stid.id, o)
Return (stid,m′)
Else:/Process received output
m′ ← Λ.Dec(stid.stL.key,m)
If m′ = (stid.seqout, out
′) :
stid.seqout ← stid.seqout + 2
stid.out← out′
m′ ← (stid.stage, stid.id, )
Return (stid,m′)
Else: Return⊥
algorithm AddInput(in, stid):
stid.InList← stid.InList + [in]
Return stid
algorithm Output(stid):
Return stid.out
Fig. 14. General SMPC protocol.
35
algorithm RemoteM(prms, hdl,m, stR):
/Initial message
If m =  :
m← (0, 1, )/Force bootstrap start
stR.IdList← stR /Input schedule
stR.stage← 0
/Bootstrap (attested labels)
If stR.stage = 0 :
(stageid, id, i)← m
o← LAC.AttestM(prms, hdl, (p, (id, )), i)
If o.stage = 1 : /IEE just finished bootstrap
stR.stage = 1; inreq← T; m′ ← 
(id1, . . . , idk)← stR.IdList; id = id1
stR.IdList← (id2, . . . , idk)
Return (id, inreq,m′, stR)
Else:/Just continue bootstrap
If stageid = 1 : /This id finished bootstrap
id← id + 1
o← LAC.AttestM(prms, hdl, (p, (id, )), )
inreq← F; m′ ← o
Return (id, inreq,m′, stR)
Else:
inreq← F; m′ ← o
Return (id, inreq,m′, stR)
/Execution (non-attested labels)
If stR.stage = 1 :
(stageid, id, i)← m
If i =  :/Move to next input (empty incoming message)
(id1, . . . , idk)← stR.IdList
inreq← T; m′ ← 
id = id1; stR.IdList← (id2, . . . , idk)
Return (id, inreq,m′, stR)
Else:/Process input and send output
o←M.Run(hdl, (q, id), i)
inreq← F; m′ ← o
If IdList = [ ] : Then stR.stage← 2/No additional inputs
Return (id, inreq,m′, stR)
Fig. 15. SMPC protocol untrusted scheduler.
of the AttKE. Due to the similarities of both proofs, we do not rewrite the whole proof,
instead we highlight the differences coming from our different notion of attestation and
our more general composition pattern.
Our proof is a sequence of four games G0′AttKE,A to G3
′
AttKE,A. We highlight here
how the sequence of games is constructed in relation with the original utility proof from
[3].
FIRST GAME HOP. The first game G0′AttKE,A is the utility game presented in Figure 13.
In [3] the first hop consists in adding a forgeAC event in the Send oracle to ensure that
the initial segment of the trace witnessed by a local party matches the initial segment
of a valid execution of the distant protocol. Here, similarly we add a forgeLAC event,
making sure that the subtrace corresponding to the appropriate label matches a remote
execution, the Send oracle is replaced by the one described in Figure 16.
The correctness of this game hop follows from the same arguments as the proof of
Theorem 3 in [4].
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Oracle Send(o∗, i):
o← LAC.Verify[stiV ](prms, li, inilast, o∗)
If o =⊥: Return⊥
If b = 0 thenM←M elseM←M′
If o 6=⊥ ∧ 6 ∃hdl s.t. ProgramM(hdl) = R∗i .
Rev(o : T iL) v filter[li]TraceM(hdl): forgeLAC← T
m∗←$ LocKE[stiKE](o)
inilast ← m∗;T iL ← m∗ : o : T iL
If stiKE.δ ∈ {derived, accept} ∧ stiKE.key /∈ fake:
key∗←$ {0, 1}λ
fake← (key, key∗) : fake
Return m∗
Fig. 16. Send oracle from G1′AttKE,A
SECOND GAME HOP. The second game hop in [4] consist in replacing the remote ma-
chine by the simulator, provided by the minimum leakage property. The minimal leak-
age property is exactly the same in AC and LAC, and this second game hop is exactly
the same.
This second game allows us to reason on the semantics of the original code instead
of the compiled code executed in an IEE. This lets us take advantage of the semantics
of parallel and sequential composition in the next game hop.
THIRD GAME HOP. In the third game hop, the crucial point is emulating a run of the
protocol using the oracles from the AttKE security game. As in the proof of Theorem 3
from [4], we keep a list of instances of key exchanges related to the various programs,
updated in the Load oracle. The NewSession oracle creates a new instance of RemKE
using the NewLoc oracle and the Send oracle uses the SendLoc oracle, exactly as in
the original utility proof. The crucial modifications appear in the Run oracle and are
presented in Figure 17.
We remark that for this last game hop to be valid, we crucially need both the fact
that only the key and relevant parts of the key exchange state are passed through φ,
which is ensured by the fact that the mapping function in the sequential composition
is (φkey|φ1| . . . |φn). Additionally, the state of the key exchange has to be completely
independent from the state of the other programs composed in parallel in order for us to
be able to emulate it using the SendRem oracle. This property is ensured by the seman-
tics of the parallel composition. With these remarks, we observe that the semantics of
this third game is exactly the same as the semantics of G2′AttKE,A, in a similar way to the
utility proof in [4]. Finally, we observe that the adversary wins G3AttKE,A if it wins the
AttKE security game (modulo the reduction simulating all non-AttKE oracles), which
concludes the proof.
I Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. This proof is made by simulation. First, we present the construction of simulator
S, with the task of interacting with A on behalf of honest participants of the protocol,
i.e.,M.Load,M.Run and Send for parties 1 to k. We then present arguments for why
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Oracle Run(hdl, (l, in)):
(R∗i , st, j, stage)← List[hdl]
If (R∗i , l0) ∈ PrgList andR∗i = LAC.Compile(〈〈P |P1 . . . |Pl〉(l0,l1,...,ln);Q〉(φkey|φ1|...|φn),p,q):
If stage = 1:
If l = (p, l0, ):
If st.finished.l: Return (F, )
o←$ SendRem(in, i, j)
Parse (o, sid, δ, pid)← o:
If δ = accept:
st.finished.l← T
st.l.key← TestRem(i, j)
Else If l = (p, lk, l′)
o← Pk[st.lk](l′, in)
st.finished.lk ← o.finished
If st.finished.lk: st.lk ← φk(st.lk)
o← (∧ni=0st.finished.li, o)
(o∗, stS)←$ S2(hdl, R∗, l, in, o, stS)
If (∧ni=0st.finished.li, o): stage = 2
T hdlR ← o∗ : in : T hdlR
Else:
o←$ Q[st](l, in)
(o∗, stS)←$ S2(hdl, P, φ,Q,R∗, in, o, stS)
Else:
(o, st, stS)←$ S3(hdl, R∗, in, st, stS)
List[hdl]← (R∗, st, j, stage)
Return o∗
Fig. 17. Run oracle from G3′AttKE,A
adversary A cannot distinguish between this displayed interaction and the real world
protocol execution.
Observe that, according to the experiment in Figure 2, despite being used in dif-
ferent contexts (e.g. the same S for emulating the machine and the presentation of
outputs), the simulator can always distinguish to which call it is responding to. This
is because it receives different inputs in different occasions, with exception of honest
party initialization and output retrieval, whose orders are predictable (GetOutput will
always provide S with an already initialized id). As such, for clarity of presentation, we
describe our simulator in Figure 18 (local participants) and Figure 19 (remote machine)
with different behavior for different calls. Notice that in this scenario there is no M,
however the simulator perfectly follows the description ofM to emulate its behaviour.
Following its description in Section 2, let SMInit(1λ) be the initialization function of
the security module, producing public parameters prms and internal state sk, and let
P ∗[hdlst, sk](l, i) be the execution of compiled P ∗ given the internal state hdlst and
private parameters sk, according to the description of the security module, producing
(possibly attested) output o∗.
The behaviour detailed in S does not trivially entail indistinguishability from the
real world on all cases. The two main differences between how the simulator handles
calls and how the same instructions would be executed in the real world are highlighted
in the presented figures, and are now further detailed.
– The simulator is replacing the exchanged keys associated with honest participants
with randomly generated ones (fake), and using them throughout the second stage of
the protocol.
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S(1λ):/parameter initialization
prms, st.sk←$ SMInit(1λ)
st.λ← 1λ; st.hdl← 0; st.fake← [ ]
Return (st, st.prms)
S(st, id):/party setup
(stL,RemKE)← SetupKE(st.λ, id)
st.id.stL ← stL
st.stage← 0
Return (st,RemKE)
S(st, id):/party initialization
st.id.InList← [ ]; st.id.stage← 0;
st.id.seqin ← 0; st.id.seqout ← 1; st.id.inlast ← 
(Rem1KE, . . . ,Rem
n
KE)← Pub
st.P ← 〈 〈Rem1KE, . . . ,RemnKE〉1,...,n ; Box〈F, Λ〉 〉φkey,p,q
st.L← {(p, (id, )), (q, id)}
st.id.stV ← (st.P, st.L)
L∗ ← {(p, (1, )), . . . , {(p, (n, ))}
st.P∗ ← LAC.Compile(prms, st.P, L∗)
st.id.InLeak← [ ]; st.id.InList← [ ]
Return st
S(st, l, id):/add inputs
stid.InLeak[id]← stid.InLeak[id] + [l]
Return st
S(st, id):/output retrieval
Return (st.id.seqout/2) + 1
SFun(st, id,m):/emulate local participant id
If st.id.stage = 0 :
(i, st.id.stV )← LAC.Verify(st.prms, (p, (id, )), st.id.inlast,m, st.id.stV )
If i =⊥: Return⊥
(o, st.id.stL)←$ LocKE(st.id.stL, i)
st.id.inlast ← o
If st.id.stL.key 6∈ st.fake ∧ st.id.stL.δ ∈ {derived, accept}:
key∗←$ {0, 1}st.λ
st.fake← (st.id.stL.key, key∗) : fake
If st.id.stL.δ = accept: stage← 1
m′ ← (st.id.stage, id, o)
Return (st,m′)
If st.id.stage = 1 :
If m =  :
l← st.id.InLeak[0]
(in1, . . . , ink)← st.id.InLeak
st.id.InLeak← (in1, . . . , ink-1)
in← {0}l
o←$ Λ.Enc(fake(st.id.stL.key), (st.id.seqin, in))
st.id.InList[st.id.seqin]← o
st.id.inlast ← o
st.id.seqin ← st.id.seqin + 2
m′ ← (st.id.stage, id, o)
Return (st,m′)
Else:
m′ ← Λ.Dec(fake(st.id.stL.key),m)
If m′ = (st.id.seqout, out
′) :
st.id.seqout ← st.id.seqout + 2
m′ ← (st.id.stage, id, )
Return (st,m′)
Else: Return⊥
Fig. 18. Description of simulator S with respect to emulating local participants.
– Instead of the honest participant’s inputs and outputs, the simulator is encrypting
strings of 0s with the same length as the real-world values (obtained by Lin and Lout).
We now argue that, nevertheless, this provides an indistinguishable view for any A.
We prove this in three game hops from the real world, from Figure 20 to Figure 23.
The first hop will replace M with the slightly different M′, which replaces keys ex-
changed by honest participants by freshly generated keys (in exactly the same way the
simulator is doing it). The correctness of this hop follows from the utility theorem, us-
ing a hybrid argument to replace keys of all k honest parties. Afterwards, we replace
the encrypted inputs/outputs of honest parties, by encrypting dummy payloads of the
correct length. The correctness of this hop follows from the indistinguishability of the
underlying authenticated encryption scheme. Finally, we restrict the possibility of A
to produce a forged encryption, by accordingly establishing a bad event. The correct-
ness of this final hop follows from the unforgeability of the underlying authenticated
encryption scheme.
The first game (Figure 20) is simply the real game expanded with the protocol in-
stantiation. In this setting, whenever the adversary sets k as 0, i.e. corrupts all partici-
pants, the simulator already produces an indistinguishable view. In this case there are no
honest inputs/outputs, so the simulator has access to all information and can therefore
execute the protocol without replacing any keys and without encrypting any dummy
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S(st,Pub, P ):/M.Load
st.hdl← st.hdl + 1
For i ∈ L: seq[i]← 0
st.HdlList← (st.hdl, seq, )
Return st.hdl
SFun(st, hdl,m):/M.Run
(P∗, seq, sthdl)← st.HdlList[hdl]
If P∗ = st.P∗:/The agreed protocol.
If (p, (id, )) 6∈ st.L: Return⊥
If sthdl[id].stage = 0 :
(id, in)← m
m′←$ P∗[sthdl, st.sk](id,m)
If st.id 6=  ∧ sthdl[id].key 6∈ st.fake ∧ sthdl[id].δ ∈ {derived, accept}:
key∗←$ {0, 1}st.λ
st.fake← (sthdl[id].key, key∗) : fake
Else If sthdl[id].stage = 1 :
(seqin, id, in)← m
If (seq[id] 6= seqin): Return⊥
If st.id 6= :/Honest participant
If st.id.InList[seq[id]] 6= in: Return⊥
l← Fun(honest, id, )
out← {0}l
m′←$ Λ.Enc(fake(sthdl.key[id]), (seq[id] + 1, in))
Else:/Corrupt participant
in∗←$ Λ.Dec(fake(sthdl.key[id]), (seq[id] + 1, in))
out← Fun(corrupt, id, in∗)
m′←$ Λ.Enc(fake(sthdl.key[id]), (seq[id] + 1, out))
seq[id]← seq[id] + 2
Else:/Any other program onM.
(id, in)← m
m′←$ P∗[sthdl, st.sk](id,m)
st.HdlList[hdl]← (P, seq, sthdl)
Return (st,m′)
Fig. 19. Description of simulator S with respect to emulating the remote machine.
payloads (st.id =  for all id), executing Fun whenever a corrupt input is provided
to produce the corresponding output. As such, the following steps will only refer to
situations in which k 6= 0, where indistinguishability is not yet established.
In the second game G1F,pi,A,M′(1λ) (Figure 21), we replace the machine in the
ideal world with the machine M ′ of the Utility game for which b = 1. This machine
performs exactly what the simulator is doing with the list fake, i.e., replacing keys
for the first k participants whenever they finish the first stage of the protocol (the key
exchange). This is possible via two steps.
Fix identity id = 1. We can replace the behaviour ofM in G0F,pi,A,M(1λ) regard-
ing this participant using the Utility Theorem 3, for which l∗ = id. In this scenario, the
key (both inM′.Run and in Send) for that particular participant will be replaced by a
fake one and stored in fake (as described in G1F,pi,A,M′(1λ), but only for id = 1). The
advantage gained by the adversary in this intermediate step is bound by its advantage
in winning the experiment in Figure 13, by providing
Rem2KE, (p, (2, )), (q, 2), . . .Rem
n
KE, (p, (n, )), (q, n), (p, (1, )),Box〈F , Λ〉, φkey
To NewSession on every call.
Now observe that, for any scenario in which m participants have had their keys
replaced by fake ones, it is possible to apply the same Utility theorem for replacing the
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G0F,pi,A,M(1λ):
(n, F, Lin, Lout)← F
prms←$M.Init(1λ)
(stA, k)←$ A(prms)
For id ∈ [1..k]:
(stid.stL, stid.pub)← SetupKE(1λ, id)
Pub← (pub1, ..., pubk)
For id ∈ [k + 1..n]:
(stA, pubid)←$ A(stA, id,Pub)
Pub← (pub1, ..., pubn)
For id ∈ [1..k]:
stid.InList← [ ]; stid.stage← 0;
stid.seqin ← 0; stid.seqout ← 1; stid.inlast ← 
(Rem1KE, . . . ,Rem
n
KE)← Pub
P ← 〈 〈Rem1KE, . . . ,RemnKE〉1,...,n ; Box〈F, Λ〉 〉φkey,p,q
L← {(p, (stid.id, )), (q, stid.id)}
stid.stV ← (P,L)
b←$ AO(stA)
Oracle SetInput(in, id):
If id 6∈ [1..k] Return⊥
stid.InList← stid.InList + [in]
Oracle Load(P ):
ReturnM.Load(P )
Oracle Run(hdl, l,m):
ReturnM.Run(hdl, l,m)
Oracle Send(id,m):
If id 6∈ [1..k] Return⊥
If stid.stage = 0 :
(i, stid.stV )← LAC.Verify(stid.prms, (p, (stid.id, )), inlast,m, stV )
If i =⊥: Return⊥
(o, stid.stL)←$ LocKE(stid.stL, i)
stid.inlast ← o
If (stid.stL.stKE.δ) = accept : Then stage← 1
m′ ← (stid.stage, stid.id, o)
Return m′
If stid.stage = 1 :
If m =  :
in← stid.InList[0]
(in1, . . . , ink)← stid.ListInid
stid.ListInid ← (in1, . . . , ink-1)
o←$ Λ.Enc(stid.stL.key, (stid.seqin, in))
stid.inlast ← o
stid.seqin ← stid.seqin + 2
m′ ← (stid.stage, stid.id, o)
Return m′
Else:
m′ ← Λ.Dec(stid.stL.key,m)
If m′ = (stid.seqout, out
′) :
stid.seqout ← stid.seqout + 2
stid.out← out′
m′ ← (stid.stage, stid.id, )
Return m′
Else: Return⊥
Oracle GetOutput(id):
If id 6∈ [1..k] Return⊥
Return stid.out
Fig. 20. Real world expanded.
keys of m + 1 participants. In order to replace all k keys, we are therefore required to
apply the same Utility theorem k times, and thus
Pr[G0F,pi,A,M(1λ)⇒ T ]− Pr[G1F,pi,A,M′(1λ)⇒ T ] ≤ AdvUTAttKE,A(λ) ∗ k.
In the third game G2F,pi,A(1λ) (Figure 22), we open the machine M ′ and change
its behaviour for instances of running program P ∗ on the second stage as follows:
– Upon receiving an honest participant input, instead of using it for computing Fun
instead uses the first element of ListIn.
– When producing an honest participant output, instead of returning an encryption of
the value received from F, it stores the value from F on an output list for this identity
OutList and returns an encryption of zeros of the same length as the output.
Similarly, on the local side for instances running the second stage:
– When called for presenting the input, instead of encrypting the actual input, it stores
it on a list of inputs InList and encrypts a string of zeros of the same length.
– Upon receiving an output, instead of decrypting and storing it on ListOut, it retrieves
the value of OutList and stores it on ListOut.
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G1F,pi,A,M′ (1
λ):
(n, F, Lin, Lout)← F
prms←$M′.Init(1λ)
fake← [ ]
(stA, k)←$ A(prms)
For id ∈ [1..k]:
(stid.stL, stid.pub)← SetupKE(1λ, id)
Pub← (pub1, ..., pubk)
For id ∈ [k + 1..n]:
(stA, pubid)←$ A(stA, id,Pub)
Pub← (pub1, ..., pubn)
For id ∈ [1..k]:
stid.InList← [ ]; stid.stage← 0;
stid.seqin ← 0; stid.seqout ← 1; stid.inlast ← 
(Rem1KE, . . . ,Rem
n
KE)← Pub
P ← 〈 〈Rem1KE, . . . ,RemnKE〉1,...,n ; Box〈F, Λ〉 〉φkey,p,q
L← {(p, (stid.id, )), (q, stid.id)}
stid.stV ← (P,L)
P∗ ← LAC.Compile(prms, P, L)
b←$ AO(stA)
Oracle SetInput(in, id):
If id 6∈ [1..k] Return⊥
stid.InList← stid.InList + [in]
Oracle Load(P ):
ReturnM′.Load(P )
Oracle Run(hdl, l,m):
flag← F
If ProgramM(hdl) = P
∗: flag← T
ReturnM′.Run(hdl, l,m, flag, fake)
Oracle Send(id,m):
If id 6∈ [1..k] Return⊥
If stid.stage = 0 :
(i, stid.stV )← LAC.Verify(stid.prms, (p, (stid.id, )), inlast,m, stV )
If i =⊥: Return⊥
(o, stid.stL)←$ LocKE(stid.stL, i)
stid.inlast ← o
If stid.stL.key 6∈ fake ∧ stid.stL.δ ∈ {derived, accept}:
key∗←$ {0, 1}λ
st.fake← (stid.stL.key, key∗) : fake
If (stid.stL.stKE.δ) = accept : Then stage← 1
m′ ← (stid.stage, stid.id, o)
Return m′
If stid.stage = 1 :
If m =  :
in← stid.InList[0]
(in1, . . . , ink)← stid.ListInid
stid.ListInid ← (in1, . . . , ink-1)
o←$ Λ.Enc(fake(stid.stL.key), (stid.seqin, in))
stid.inlast ← o
stid.seqin ← stid.seqin + 2
m′ ← (stid.stage, stid.id, o)
Return m′
Else:
m′ ← Λ.Dec(fake(stid.stL.key),m)
If m′ = (stid.seqout, out
′) :
stid.seqout ← stid.seqout + 2
stid.out← out′
m′ ← (stid.stage, stid.id, )
Return m′
Else: Return⊥
Oracle GetOutput(id):
If id 6∈ [1..k] Return⊥
Return stid.out
Fig. 21. First hop of the proof.
We upper bound the distance between these two games, by constructing an adver-
sary B against the indistinguishability of encryption scheme Λ such that
Pr[G1F,pi,M′(1λ)⇒ T ]− Pr[G2F,pi(1λ)⇒ T ] ≤ AdvINDΛ,B(λ) ∗ k ∗ 2I
Adversary B simulates the environment of G2F,pi,A(1λ) as follows: it first has to try
and guess which message will be used to distinguish. Let I be the maximum number
of inputs adversary A chooses to input for any participant. It samples uniformly from
[1..k] a participant p, and from [1..(I ∗ 2)] a message m. Since every input produces an
output, we establish that
– If m ∈ [1..I], B picked the m-th input.
– If m ∈ [I + 1, . . . , (I ∗ 2)], B picked the mI -th output.
and proceed accordingly.B replaces all calls for encryption/decryption for inputs/outputs
of participant p with similar calls to Λ.Enc and Λ.Dec, with exception of the following.
Ifm ∈ [1..I], whenever Send(id,m) for id = p is called for them-th time on the second
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stage, B challenges INDΛ,B(1λ) with message
((stid.seqin, in), (stid.seqin, {0}|in|))
Otherwise, whenever Run(hdl, l,m) for l = p and P = P ∗ (the agreed protocol) is
called for the mI -th time on the second stage, B challenges INDΛ,B(1λ) with message
((seq[id] + 1, out), (seq[id] + 1, {0}|out|))
Observe that any advantage B acquires in this transformation can be effectively
used to distinguish between G1F,pi,M′(1λ) and G2F,pi(1λ), since the only difference
between the two games is the encryption of either the first message (the real value) or
the second (the dummy payload with the same length). The two games are identical
modulo this difference.
In the fourth game G3F,pi,A(1λ) (Figure 23), the adversary loses whenever authForge
event occurs. Intuitively, this event corresponds to the adversary producing an encryp-
tion that was not produced by either Send orM.Run for id ∈ [1..k] (honest participant),
and hence constitutes a forgery with respect toΛ. Given that the two games are identical
until this event occurs, we have that
Pr[G2F,pi,A(1λ)⇒ T ]− Pr[G3F,pi,A(1λ)⇒ T ] ≤ Pr[ authForge ] .
We upper bound the distance between these two games, by constructing an adver-
sary C against the existential unforgeability of encryption scheme Λ such that
Pr[ authForge ] ≤ AdvUFΛ,C(λ) ∗ k
Adversary C simulates the environment of G3F,pi,A(1λ) as follows: it first has to try
and guess which session will produce the forgery. As such, it samples uniformly from
[1..k] a participant p and replaces the key generated for honest participant p (before
adding to fake) with the key generated by Λ.Gen. From there on, every time an encryp-
tion/decryption is requested for p, the same operation will be requested to Λ.Enc and
Λ.Dec, respectively.
When authForge is set, according to the rules of G3F,pi,A(1λ), algorithm C outputs
candidate encryption m. It remains to show that this is a valid forgery. To see this, first
observe that this is indeed a valid encryption, as decryption is performed on this value
immediately before authForge occurs. It suffices to establish that message m could not
have been queried from the Λ oracle. Access to this oracle is only permitted on the
encryption of inputs for this participant, and on outputs to this participant (when exe-
cuting Run). From the construction of these operations and the sequence numbers they
entail, we know that producing such an encryption would only occur via the inclusion
of m in authList. Since we know this is not the case, m could not have been queried to
the encryption oracle. We conclude therefore that C outputs a valid forgery whenever
authForge occurs.
Finally, we argue that the behavior displayed by the simulator is indistinguishable
to what adversary A observes in game G3F,pi,A(1λ). This is the case because the sim-
ulator no longer has private information to which he has no access to. In G3F,pi,A(1λ),
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only the length of honest inputs and outputs is required to emulate their private inputs
and outputs, to which S has access to via Lin and Lout. Additionally, the simulator uses
the same message sequence numbers to prevent A from forcing an execution that de-
viates from the order in which inputs are provided and outputs are retrieved. Since the
executions are the same for all other aspects (including key replacements to fake and
exclusion of forged encryptions), A is provided the same view in both worlds.
Let
AdvDistinguishF,A = Pr[RealF,pi,A,M(1
λ)⇒ T ]− Pr[ IdealF,pi,A,S(1λ)⇒ T ]
To conclude, we have that
AdvDistinguishF,A = Pr[G0F,pi,A,M(1
λ) ]− Pr[G3F,pi,A(1λ) ]
= (Pr[G0F,pi,A,M(1λ) ]− Pr[G1F,pi,A,M′(1λ) ]) + (Pr[G1F,pi,A,M′(1λ) ]−
Pr[G2F,pi,A(1λ) ]) + (Pr[G2F,pi,A(1λ) ]− Pr[G3F,pi,A(1λ) ])
≤ AdvAttUT,A(λ) ∗ k + AdvINDΛ,B(λ) ∗ k ∗ 2I + Pr[forgeAuth]
≤ AdvAttUT,A(λ) ∗ k + AdvINDΛ,B(λ) ∗ k ∗ 2I + AdvUFΛ,C(λ) ∗ k
and Theorem 2 follows.
J Side channels and software resilient against timing attacks
Recent works [42,17] have pointed out that IEE-enabled systems such as Intel’s SGX
do not offer more protection against side-channel attacks than traditional microproces-
sors. This is a relevant concern, since the IEE trust model which we also adopt in this
paper admits that the code outside IEEs is potentially malicious and that the machine
is under the control of an untrusted party. We believe that there are two aspects to this
problem that should be considered separately. The first aspect is related to the produc-
tion of the IEE-enabled hardware/firmware itself and the protection of the long-term
secrets that are used by the attestation security module. If the computations performed
by the attestation infrastructure itself are vulnerable to side-channel attacks, then there
is nothing that can be done at the protocol design/implementation level. This aspect of
trust is within the remit of the equipment manufacturers.
An orthogonal issue is the possibility that software running inside an IEE leaks
part of its state or short-term secrets via side channels. Here one should distinguish be-
tween software observations and hardware/physical observations. In the former, soft-
ware co-located in the machine observes timing channels based on memory access
patterns, control flow, branch prediction, cache-based based attacks [17], page-fault
side channels [42], etc. Protection against this type of side-channel attacks has been
widely studied in the practical crypto community, where a consensus exists that writ-
ing so-called constant-time software is the most effective countermeasure [8,34]. As
mentioned above, constant-time software has the property that the entire sequence of
memory addresses (in both data and code memory) accessed by a program can be pre-
dicted in advance from public inputs, e.g., the length of messages. When it comes to
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hardware/physical side-channel attacks such as those relying on temperature measure-
ments, power analysis, or electromagnetic radiation, the effectiveness of software coun-
termeasures is very limited, and improving hardware defenses again implies obtaining
additional guarantees from the equipment manufacturer.
Our implementation sgx-mpc-nacl enforces a strict constant-time policy that is
consistent with the IEE trust model. As such, to provide a protocol that is fully constant-
time, one must ensure that the executed functionality is also constant-time. Recent work
in the area of formal verification area sheds new light how this can be achieved over
low-level code in a fully automatic way [1].
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G2F,pi,A(1λ):
(n, F, Lin, Lout)← F
(prms, sk)←$ SMInit(1λ)
hdl← 0
fake← [ ]
(stA, k)←$ A(prms)
For id ∈ [1..k]:
(stid.stL, stid.pub)← SetupKE(1λ, id)
Pub← (pub1, ..., pubk)
For id ∈ [k + 1..n]:
(stA, pubid)←$ A(stA, id,Pub)
Pub← (pub1, ..., pubn)
For id ∈ [1..k]:
stid.ListIn← [ ]; stid.ListOut← [ ]; stid.stage← 0
stid.seqin ← 0; stid.seqout ← 1; stid.inlast ← 
(Rem1KE, . . . ,Rem
n
KE)← Pub
P ← 〈 〈Rem1KE, . . . ,RemnKE〉1,...,n ; Box〈F, Λ〉 〉φkey,p,q
L← {(p, (stid.id, )), (q, stid.id)}
stid.stV ← (P,L)
P∗ ← LAC.Compile(prms, P, L)
b←$ AO(stA)
Oracle Run(hdl, l,m):
(P, seq, sthdl)← HdlList[hdl]
If P = P∗:/The agreed protocol.
If (p, (id, )) 6∈ L: Return⊥
If sthdl[id].stage = 0 :
(id, in)← m
m′←$ P∗[sthdl, sk](id,m)
If stid 6=  ∧ sthdl[id].key 6∈ fake ∧ sthdl[id].δ ∈ {derived, accept}:
key∗←$ {0, 1}1λ
st.fake← (sthdl[id].key, key∗) : fake
Else If sthdl[id].stage = 1 :
(seqin, id, in)← m
If (seq[id] 6= seqin): Return⊥
If stid 6= :/Honest participant
m′ ← Λ.Dec(fake(stid.stL.key), in)
If m′ = (seq[id], out′) :
out← F[stF](id, InList[seq[id]])
stid.OutList[seq[id] + 1]← out
m′←$ Λ.Enc(fake(sthdl.key[id]), (seq[id] + 1, {0}|out|))
Else:/Corrupt participant
in∗←$ Λ.Dec(sthdl.key[id], (seq[id] + 1, in))
out← F[stF](id, in)
m′←$ Λ.Enc(sthdl.key[id], (seq[id] + 1, out))
seq[id]← seq[id] + 2
Else:/Any other program onM.
(id, in)← m
m′←$ P∗[sthdl, st.sk](id,m)
HdlList[hdl]← (P, seq, sthdl)
Return m′
Oracle Load(P ):
hdl← hdl + 1
For i ∈ L: seq[i]← 0
HdlList← (hdl, seq, )
Return hdl
Oracle SetInput(in, id):
If id 6∈ [1..k] Return⊥
stid.InList← stid.InList + [in]
Oracle Send(id,m):
If id 6∈ [1..k] Return⊥
If stid.stage = 0 :
(i, stid.stV )← LAC.Verify(stid.prms, (p, (stid.id, )), inlast,m, stV )
If i =⊥: Return⊥
(o, stid.stL)←$ LocKE(stid.stL, i)
stid.inlast ← o
If stid.stL.key 6∈ fake ∧ stid.stL.δ ∈ {derived, accept}:
key∗←$ {0, 1}λ
st.fake← (stid.stL.key, key∗) : fake
If (stid.stL.stKE.δ) = accept : Then stage← 1
m′ ← (stid.stage, stid.id, o)
Return m′
If stid.stage = 1 :
If m =  :
in← stid.InList[0]
(in1, . . . , ink)← stid.ListInid
stid.ListInid ← (in1, . . . , ink-1)
stid.InList[stid.seqin]← in
o←$ Λ.Enc(fake(stid.stL.key), (stid.seqin, {0}|in|))
stid.inlast ← o
stid.seqin ← stid.seqin + 2
m′ ← (stid.stage, stid.id, o)
Return m′
Else:
m′ ← Λ.Dec(fake(stid.stL.key),m)
If m′ = (stid.seqout, out
′) :
stid.ListOut← stid.OutList[stid.seqout] : stid.ListOut
stid.seqout ← stid.seqout + 2
m′ ← (stid.stage, stid.id, )
Return m′
Else: Return⊥
Oracle GetOutput(id):
If id 6∈ [1..k] Return⊥
(out1, . . . , outk)← stid.ListOut
Return out1 || . . . || outi
Fig. 22. Second hop of the proof.
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G3F,pi,A(1λ):
(n, F, Lin, Lout)← F
(prms, sk)←$ SMInit(1λ)
hdl← 0
fake← [ ]
forgeAuth← F
authList← [ ]
(stA, k)←$ A(prms)
For id ∈ [1..k]:
(stid.stL, stid.pub)← SetupKE(1λ, id)
Pub← (pub1, ..., pubk)
For id ∈ [k + 1..n]:
(stA, pubid)←$ A(stA, id,Pub)
Pub← (pub1, ..., pubn)
For id ∈ [1..k]:
stid.ListIn← [ ]; stid.ListOut← [ ]; stid.stage← 0
stid.seqin ← 0; stid.seqout ← 1; stid.inlast ← 
(Rem1KE, . . . ,Rem
n
KE)← Pub
P ← 〈 〈Rem1KE, . . . ,RemnKE〉1,...,n ; Box〈F, Λ〉 〉φkey,p,q
L← {(p, (stid.id, )), (q, stid.id)}
stid.stV ← (P,L)
P∗ ← LAC.Compile(prms, P, L)
b←$ AO(stA)
If forgeAuth = T: b←$ {0, 1}
Oracle Run(hdl, l,m):
(P, seq, sthdl)← HdlList[hdl]
If P = P∗:/The agreed protocol.
If (p, (id, )) 6∈ L: Return⊥
If sthdl[id].stage = 0 :
(id, in)← m
m′←$ P∗[sthdl, sk](id,m)
If stid 6=  ∧ sthdl[id].key 6∈ fake ∧ sthdl[id].δ ∈ {derived, accept}:
key∗←$ {0, 1}1λ
st.fake← (sthdl[id].key, key∗) : fake
Else If sthdl[id].stage = 1 :
(seqin, id, in)← m
If (seq[id] 6= seqin): Return⊥
If stid 6= :/Honest participant
If m′ = (seq[id], out′) :
out← F[stF](id, InList[seq[id]])
stid.OutList[seq[id] + 1]← out
m′←$ Λ.Enc(fake(sthdl.key[id]), (seq[id] + 1, {0}|out|))
authList← (fake(sthdl.key[id]), (seq[id] + 1, {0}|out|)) : authList
Else:/Corrupt participant
in∗←$ Λ.Dec(sthdl.key[id], (seq[id] + 1, in))
out← F[stF](id, in)
m′←$ Λ.Enc(sthdl.key[id], (seq[id] + 1, out))
seq[id]← seq[id] + 2
Else:/Any other program onM.
(id, in)← m
m′←$ P∗[sthdl, st.sk](id,m)
HdlList[hdl]← (P, seq, sthdl)
Return m′
Oracle Load(P ):
hdl← hdl + 1
For i ∈ L: seq[i]← 0
HdlList← (hdl, seq, )
Return hdl
Oracle SetInput(in, id):
If id 6∈ [1..k] Return⊥
stid.InList← stid.InList + [in]
Oracle Send(id,m):
If id 6∈ [1..k] Return⊥
If stid.stage = 0 :
(i, stid.stV )← LAC.Verify(stid.prms, (p, (stid.id, )), inlast,m, stV )
If i =⊥: Return⊥
(o, stid.stL)←$ LocKE(stid.stL, i)
stid.inlast ← o
If stid.stL.key 6∈ fake ∧ stid.stL.δ ∈ {derived, accept}:
key∗←$ {0, 1}λ
st.fake← (stid.stL.key, key∗) : fake
If (stid.stL.stKE.δ) = accept : Then stage← 1
m′ ← (stid.stage, stid.id, o)
Return m′
If stid.stage = 1 :
If m =  :
in← stid.InList[0]
(in1, . . . , ink)← stid.ListInid
stid.ListInid ← (in1, . . . , ink-1)
stid.InList[stid.seqin]← in
o←$ Λ.Enc(fake(stid.stL.key), (stid.seqin, {0}|in|))
authList← (fake(sthdl.key[id]), (stid.seqin, {0}|in|)) : authList
stid.inlast ← o
stid.seqin ← stid.seqin + 2
m′ ← (stid.stage, stid.id, o)
Return m′
Else:
m′ ← Λ.Dec(fake(stid.stL.key),m)
If m′ 6=⊥ ∧ (fake(stid.stL.key),m) 6∈ authList:
forgeAuth← T
If m′ = (stid.seqout, out
′) :
stid.ListOut← stid.OutList[stid.seqout] : stid.ListOut
stid.seqout ← stid.seqout + 2
stid.out← out′
m′ ← (stid.stage, stid.id, )
Return m′
Else: Return⊥
Oracle GetOutput(id):
If id 6∈ [1..k] Return⊥
(out1, . . . , outk)← ListOutid
Return out1 || . . . || outi
Fig. 23. Third hop of the proof.
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